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Zusammenfassung
Produktivität wird allgemein als treibende Kraft für  
das Wirtschaftswachstum und als Indikator für den  
materiellen Wohlstand einer Gesellschaft angesehen. 
Jedoch haben viele Industrieländer in den letzten Jahr­
zehnten ein rückläufiges Produktivitätswachstum und 
eine Ausweitung der Produktivitätsspreizung erlebt.  
Mögliche Erklärungen reichen von rückläufigen Investi­
tionen in Forschung und Entwicklung über strukturelle 
Veränderungen im Hinblick auf Verschiebungen hin zu 
mehr Dienstleistungen bis hin zu vermehrten Messfehlern 
durch die zunehmende Digitalisierung. In diesem Bericht 
untersuchen wir die Rolle, die das Wettbewerbsumfeld 
eines Unternehmens für die eigene Produktivitätsent­
wicklung spielt. Ist eine zunehmende Branchenkonzen­
tration – und der damit einhergehende erwartete Rück­
gang des Wett bewerbs – mit geringerer Produktivität 
verbunden? Und wenn ja, was ist die treibende Kraft  
dieses Effekts?
In einem ersten Schritt schätzen wir die Preis­Kosten­
Margen auf Firmenebene in Form von Markups (Preisauf­
schläge, d. h., Preis über den Grenzkosten) als Maßzahl 
für die Preissetzungsmacht eines Unternehmens und 
den Grad des Wettbewerbs, dem es ausgesetzt ist. Unsere 
Ergebnisse basieren auf Daten von knapp 12.000 deut­
schen Unternehmen für den Zeitraum 2007 bis 2016.
1.	 Die	durchschnittlichen	Markups	liegen	bei	30-45 Pro­
zent und sind vergleichsweise niedriger als in größeren 
Industrienationen wie den USA, entsprechen jedoch den 
durchschnittlichen Schätzungen für Europa. Über den 
Zeitraum der Stichprobe zeigt sich ein leicht positiver 
Trend der durchschnittlichen Markups. Die Finanzkrise 
hatte im Gegensatz zu den USA lediglich einen geringen 
negativen Effekt auf die durchschnittlichen Markups  
in Deutschland. Der Dienstleistungssektor war treibende 
Kraft für diesen Rückgang der durchschnittlichen  
Markups in den Jahren 2007­2009; andere Sektoren 
wie das verarbeitende Gewerbe und der Handelssektor 
verspürten keine derartigen Auswirkungen.
2. Kleinere Unternehmen weisen im Durchschnitt höhere 
Markups auf – eine Beobachtung, die in den meisten 
Branchen zu finden ist. Eine potenzielle Erklärung  
für diese Beziehung zwischen Markups und Unter­
neh mens größe ist die Breite des Geschäftsfeldes 
eines Unternehmens. Unternehmen mit einem engen 
Geschäftsfokus, die nur in wenigen Märkten aktiv sind 
(Nischenunternehmen, die im Durchschnitt kleiner sind), 
weisen höhere Markups auf als Unternehmen mit 
einem breiteren Geschäftsfokus.
3. Höhere Markups sind über die gesamte Unternehmens­
verteilung zu beobachten. Sowohl kleine als auch große 
Unternehmen (aber nicht mittelgroße Unternehmen) 
verzeichnen während der Finanzkrise einen Rückgang 
der Markups, jedoch weisen gegen Ende unseres Mess­
zeitraums lediglich große Unternehmen Markups über 
dem Vorkrisenniveau auf. Die „Erholung“ war für klei­
nere Unternehmen langsamer und weniger effektiv.
Neben der vorangegangenen deskriptiven Beschreibung 
der Markup­Entwicklung untersucht die vorliegende  
Studie den Zusammenhang zwischen Markups und  
Produktivität.
4. Markups erklären die Produktivitätsentwicklung der 
verschiedenen Sektoren in unterschiedlichem Maße.  
Im verarbeitenden Gewerbe und im Handel ist der 
Effekt stark. Die Streuung der Preisaufschläge erklärt 
etwa	20 Prozent	der	Produktivitätsunterschiede	im	
verarbeitenden	Gewerbe	und	mehr	als	40 Prozent	im	
Handelssektor. In dienstleistungsbezogenen Sektoren 
ist der Effekt mittelstark – die Variation der Produk­
tivität auf Unternehmensebene, die auf Preisaufschläge 
zurückzuführen	ist,	beträgt	hier	6 Prozent.
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5. Bei Unternehmen aus dem verarbeitenden Gewerbe 
und Handelssektor sind höhere Markups mit geringe­
rer Produktivität verbunden. Dieser Zusammenhang 
ist über die Zeit konstant. In diesen Sektoren sinkt 
die	Produktivität	durchschnittlich	um	1,4 Prozent	als	
Reaktion auf einen Anstieg der Preisaufschläge um 
1 Prozent.	Die	Auswirkungen	sind	für	den	Handelssek­
tor (mit einem Rückgang von 4 %) stärker als für das 
verarbeitende Gewerbe (mit einem Rückgang von 2 %). 
Die Ergebnisse für Unternehmen in Dienstleistungs­
sektoren sind dagegen umgekehrt: Eine Erhöhung der 
Markups hat einen geringen, jedoch positiven Effekt 
auf die Produktivität der Unternehmen.
Der geschätzte Zusammenhang von Markups und Produk­
tivität stellt den kombinierten Effekt dar. Die Hinzunahme 
von Unternehmensdaten aus dem Mannheimer Innovati­
onspanel des ZEW erlaubt eine differenzierte Betrachtung 
der direkten (z. B. via Managementpraktiken) und indirek­
ten (über veränderte Innovationsaktivitäten) Einflüsse  
der Markups auf Produktivität. Für diese Analyse wird 
eine Teilstichprobe von rund 1.900 Unternehmen heran­
gezogen. 
6. Im verarbeitenden Gewerbe sowie im Handelssektor 
ist der direkte Effekt negativ und entspricht dem all­
gemeinen Konsens, dass verschärfter Wettbewerb die 
Produktivität erhöht. Im Dienstleistungssektor hinge­
gen ist der geschätzte direkte Effekt positiv. Dies deutet 
auf einen gegenteiligen Effekt hin: Ein verschärfter 
Wettbewerb im Dienstleistungssektor hat einen nega­
tiven Einfluss auf die Produktivitätsentwicklung. 
7. Im verarbeitenden Gewerbe und im Dienstleistungs­
sektor ist der indirekte Effekte von Markups auf  
Produktivität negativ; weniger Wettbewerb senkt  
die Produktivität. Dies liegt darin begründet, dass  
eine Verringerung des Wettbewerbsdrucks einen  
negativen Einfluss auf die Innovationsaktivität hat. 
Eine Einsparung der Innovationsausgaben wiederum 
wirkt sich negativ auf die Produktivitätsentwicklung 
aus. Im verarbeitenden Gewerbe ist der indirekte Effekt 
gering und verstärkt den ohnehin negativen direkten 
Effekt. Im Dienstleistungssektor hingegen ist der nega­
tive indirekte Effekt stark und gleicht den positiven 
direkten Effekt teilweise aus. Für den Handelssektor 
ist der indirekte Effekt nicht signifikant. Das bedeutet, 
dass die Innovationstätigkeit im Handelssektor nicht 
als Wirkungskanal des Wettbewerbs (oder dem Fehlen 
eines solchen) auf die Produktivität agiert. 
Die Erkenntnis, dass Markups starke direkte Auswirkun­
gen (im Vergleich zu den innovationsorientierten 
indirek ten Auswirkungen) in allen Sektoren außer dem 
Dienstleistungssektor haben, unterstreicht das Potenzial 
wettbewerbspolitischer Maßnahmen, die auf eine Minde­
rung des Produktivitätsrückgangs abzielen. Dies gilt ins­
besondere für den Handelssektor. Im Dienstleistungssek­
tor hingegen muss die Interdependenz von Wettbewerb 
und Innovation in ihrer Auswirkung auf die Produktivität 
berücksichtigt werden. In diesem Fall gleicht der indirekte 
Effekt den direkten Effekt teilweise aus. Daher ist stets 
eine gemeinsame Betrachtung beider Effekte notwendig, 
um eine fundierte und aufschlussreiche Analyse wett­
bewerbspolitischer Maßnahmen vornehmen zu können.
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Abstract
Productivity is seen as a driving force behind economic 
growth and an indicator of a society’s material wellbe­
ing. Over the past decades, however, many industrialized 
countries have experienced declining productivity growth 
and an expansion of the productivity differential. Possible 
explanations range from declining investment in R & D  
to structural changes to more services and increased 
measurement errors due to increasing digitalization.  
In this report, we study the role that a firm’s competi­
tive environment plays for its own productivity develop­
ment. Is an increase in industry concentration – and the 
expected decrease in competition – associated with lower 
productivity? And what is the underlying driving force of 
this effect?
We estimate firm­level price­cost margins in the form of 
price markups (i. e., price above marginal cost) as a proxy 
for a firm’s pricing power and the degree of competition 
that it is exposed to. We obtain results using data from a 
sample of 12,000 German firms over the period of 2007 
through 2016.
1. Average price markups across all industries are at 
30-45 percent,	and	thus	lower	than	what	has	been	
found for the United States but in line with estimates 
for Europe. Over the course of our sample, markups 
exhibit a slight positive trend. Unlike in the United 
States, the financial crisis had only a small negative 
effect on price markups in Germany. The decline in 
economy­wide average markups in 2007­2009 was 
driven by effects in services, whereas the manufac­
turing and trade sectors did not experience any such 
effects.
2. We find that smaller firms exhibit, on average, higher 
price markups – a pattern we observe in most sectors. 
One potential factor for this relationship between price 
markups and firm size is the degree of competitive 
exposure from a broader rather than a narrower busi­
ness focus. We find that firms with a narrow business 
focus that are active in only a few markets (niche firms 
that are on average smaller) exhibit higher markups 
than firms with a broader business focus.
3. We observe an increase in price markups across the 
entire firm­level distribution – not simply a further 
increase in markups by firms that already exhibit 
relatively high markups. Both small and large firms 
(but not medium­sized firms) show a decline in price 
markups during the financial crisis, but at the end of 
our sample period only large firms have markups above 
the pre­crisis levels. The “recovery” for small firms 
has been slower and less effective.
We further examine the relationship between price 
markups and productivity – with the goal of explaining 
future productivity with price markups.
4. Price markups explain productivity to varying degrees 
across different industries. The effect in manufacturing 
and trade is strong, with firm­level variation in markups 
explaining	about	20 percent	of	the	variation	in	produc­
tivity	in	the	manufacturing	sector	and	more	than	40 per­
cent in the trade sector. In services­related sectors, the 
effect is of medium strength – the variation in firm­level 
productivity that is attributable to price markups is 
6 percent.
5. For firms in the manufacturing and trade sectors,  
we find that higher markups are associated with lower 
productivity, a relationship that is constant over time. 
Our estimates suggest that productivity decreases by 
about	1.4 percent	in	response	to	a	1 percent	increase	 
of price markups. The effects are stronger for the trade 
sector (with a 4 % decrease) than in manufacturing 
(with a 2 % decrease). The results for firms in ser­
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vice­related sectors are reversed: an increase in price 
markups has a small but positive effect on firm­level 
productivity.
The estimated baseline effects of price markups on pro­
ductivity are combined effects. Using firm­level innovation 
data from the ZEW’s Mannheim Innovation Panel for a 
subsample of about 1,900 firms, we can separately estimate  
a direct effect of price markups on productivity (e. g., via 
managerial practices) and an indirect effect (by way of 
a firm’s innovation activities that are a function of price 
markups).
6. In the manufacturing and trade sectors, the direct 
effect is negative and in line with the conventional view 
that more competition increases productivity. In the 
services sector, on the other hand, the estimated direct 
effect is positive, suggesting that more competition in 
that sector has a dampening effect on productivity.
7. The indirect effect of price markups on productivity is 
negative in the manufacturing and services sector – 
more competition lowers productivity because it lowers 
innovation expenditure which in return lowers produc­
tivity. In manufacturing, the indirect effect is relatively 
small and reinforces the negative direct effect. In ser­
vices, on the other hand, the negative indirect effect  
is sizable and partially offsets the positive direct effect. 
For the trade sector, we do not find a significant indi­
rect effect and conclude that a firm’s innovation activ­
ity does not contribute to the effect of competition (or 
the lack thereof) on productivity.
Our findings of relatively strong direct effects of price 
markups (in comparison to the innovation­centered 
indirect effects) in all sectors but services highlight the 
potential for a well­tailored competition policy approach 
in society’s effort to tackle the productivity slowdown. 
This is particularly true for the trade sector, where the 
effect of competition on R & D and innovation is of limited 
significance for the determination of firm­level produc­
tivity. For services, on the other hand, the interdepend­
ence of competition and innovation in their effect on 
productivity must be taken into account as the indirect 
effect partially offsets the direct effect of competition on 
productivity. Considering one without the other will be 
misguiding.
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1 Introduction
The conventional view in the literature (particularly in the 
literature on competition economics and policy) is that 
higher industry concentration (or higher price markups) 
has a negative effect on productivity. Put differently, if 
industry concentration is taken to serve as a proxy for 
market power (and underlying weaker competition),2 then 
we would expect a positive relationship between competi­
tion and productivity (or: a negative relationship between 
markups and productivity). Responsible for this link are a 
direct effect (when technology is taken as given) and an indi-
rect effect (when endogenizing the level of technology that  
is available to firms).
A key mechanism for the direct effect of competition on 
productivity that has been put forward is the idea that com­
petition induces firms to adopt more efficient processes and 
practices – given their availability. A lack of competition 
reduces this incentive, an effect that has become known as 
the “quiet­life hypothesis” (Hicks, 1935) or as the notion 
of “X­inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966).3 Recent empirical 
work finds support for this mechanism.4 An alternative 
explanation for the positive relationship is a “Darwinian 
mechanism” (Motta, 2004) where the less productive firms 
2 For a discussion of the (theoretical) positive relationship between  
the average degree of market power (and lower competition) and  
the degree of industry concentration (measured as the Herfindahl­ 
Hirschman Index, HHI), see for instance Motta (2004:123­4). In a  
recent review of the literature, Wessel (2018:109) concludes that 
“preponderance of evidence across the proliferating body of research 
suggests that industry consolidation is causing a troubling decline in 
competition, limiting the country’s capacity to innovate, create jobs, 
and sustain overall economic health.”
3 More recent theoretical work by, for instance, Hart (1983) and 
Schmidt (1997) is in line with this early literature.
4 Schmitz (2005) concludes that in the U.S. iron ore industry, higher 
productivity was a result of investment in new management practices; 
Matsa (2011) argues that retailers, facing increased competition after 
entry of Wal­Mart in a local market, increased productivity through 
investment in inventory control; Bloom et al. (2019) find a positive 
relationship between competition and strong management practices 
(inducing higher productivity). Other examples are Nickell (1996), 
Caves and Barton (1990), Green and Mayes (1991), or Backus (2019).
1.1 Background
Productivity is seen as a driving force behind economic 
growth and as an indicator of a society’s material wellbe­
ing. Over the past decades, however, many industrialized 
countries have experienced declining productivity growth 
and an expansion of the productivity differential (Peters et 
al., 2018). This development is also relevant for Germany, 
where a slowdown of total factor productivity growth 
has been observed for the second half of the last century, 
with a more serious development since the beginning of 
the 2000s. The academic literature has responded with a 
revived interest in the sources of this decline in productivity  
growth (e. g., Bloom et al., 2020)1. Possible explanations 
range from declining investment in R & D to structural 
changes to more services and increased measurement 
errors due to increasing digitalization. In this report, we 
study the role that a firm’s competitive environment plays 
for its own productivity development. Is an increase in 
industry concentration – and the expected decrease in 
competition – associated with lower productivity? And 
what is responsible for this effect?
A first glimpse at data for the United States seems to sup­
port such a relationship. While productivity growth has 
slowed down, industry concentration as well as firms’ mar­
ket power have seen an upward trend. For instance, Grullon 
et	al.	(2019)	find	that	at	least	75 percent	of	all	U.S.	indus­
tries have experienced an increase in concentration. They 
attribute this trend to lax interpretation and application of 
competition policy rules on the one hand and to increased 
technological barriers to entry on the other hand. They 
conclude that this increase in concentration has resulted 
in a decrease in competition. Similarly – and providing an 
increase in market power as an explanation – for the U.S., 
De Loecker et al. (2020) document an increase of price­cost 
margins	from	21 percent	(1980)	to	61 percent	(2016).
1 A comprehensive review of this literature can be found in Peters  
et al. (2018)
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are driven out of the market – for competitive industries 
more so than for highly concentrated ones. Asplund and 
Nocke (2006), for instance, provide a theoretical framework 
to that effect, and empirical support for this explanation 
can be found in Olley and Pakes (1999), Disney et al. (2003), 
Syverson (2004), or Backus (2019).5 Both explanations yield 
a negative (causal) relationship between price markups and 
productivity.
Other strands of the literature, however, have argued (and 
found) a positive relationship. De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012:2463) allude to models in industrial organization that 
predict that more productive firms (with lower marginal 
costs) are able to charge higher markups, ceteris paribus.6 
They indeed find a highly significant and positive rela­
tionship between price markups and productivity. Sim­
ilar results can be found in Altomonte et al. (2018), who 
estimate a markup­productivity elasticity of 1.2 to 1.4.7 
A different argument for a positive markup­productivity 
relationship is brought forward by Autor et al. (2020) who 
find evidence for rising industry concentration that is the 
result of increased productivity. They argue that technolog­
ical changes give rise to more concentrated markets (with 
“superstar firms“) as the most productive firms get more 
sales. The result is more product market concentration, and 
markets are dominated by superstar firms with higher price 
markups. A similar argument is put forward by Hsieh and 
Rossi­Hansberg (2019) who find that higher concentration 
is the result of more efficient firms competing in more 
localized markets.
5 A third explanation is by Neven and Röller (1996). They argue that, 
under weaker competition, firms are more likely to share rents with 
their stake holders, which has a negative effect on productivity. Simi­
lar conclusions can be drawn from Dunne et al. (2010) who show that 
in the cement industry the productivity­increasing investment was in 
the form of renegotiation of work rules and contracts.
6 The authors acknowledge that marginal cost may in fact be a bad 
proxy for productivity, citing Katayama et al. (2009) and De Loecker 
(2011). To see that the conjectured relationship is critically depend­
ent on key structural assumptions of the models, consider the in­
verse­elasticity rule for monopoly pricing, (p-c)       1––––  =  ––   p        η
 where p is the 
price, c the firm’s marginal cost, and η the price elasticity of demand. 
(p-c) 
––––     p         is called the Lerner index. We can rearrange this rule to obtain  
an expression for markups used by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) 
(as well as in this report):   p      η –– = ––––  c      η–1 . For instance, under a constant­ 
elasticity demand function in a monopoly, a change in marginal costs 
(productivity) will have no effect on the firm’s markup, as the markup 
is constant (and determined by price elasticity η only).
7 Both author teams estimate this relationship with price markups as 
dependent left­hand side variable and productivity as independent 
right­hand side variable in their estimation specifications. We will 
take a different approach, assuming productivity as the dependent 
variable and (lagged) price markups as explanatory variable.
The indirect effect of price markups on productivity is by 
way of innovation. The vast majority of empirical studies 
has shown that innovation has a positive effect on pro­
ductivity (Hall, 2011; Mohnen and Hall, 2013; Peters et al., 
2017). The evidence on how competition affects innovation, 
on the other hand, is much more complex and less clear. 
Theoretical models show that under certain conditions, 
competition can increase investment in innovation while 
under different conditions competition reduces incentives 
to innovate. Two seminal contributions with diverging 
conclusions are Schumpeter (1934) and Arrow (1962) (also, 
see Gilbert (2006) for a review of the literature). Accord­
ing to Schumpeter, innovation incentives increase with ex 
ante market power. Firms with greater market power are 
better able to finance R & D through own profits, can more 
easily appropriate the returns from innovation, and they 
face lower uncertainty associated with excessive rivalry that 
tends to reduce the incentive to innovate. On the contrary, 
Arrow argues in favor of competition being conducive for 
innovation since an incumbent monopolist would sacrifice 
his own current profits and has thus a lower incentive to 
innovate than an entrant (Arrow’s “replacement effects“). 
The model by Aghion et al. (2005) combines these counter­
vailing effects and establishes an inverted­U relationship: 
Competition fosters innovation in industries where firms 
operate at the same technological level (neck­and­neck), 
whereas in technologically unleveled industries increased 
competition lowers innovation incentives for laggard firms. 
A few recent contributions have shown a positive effect 
of competition on innovation. Aghion et al. (2018), for 
instance, provide results on a causal relationship between 
competition and innovation from laboratory experiments. 
Haucap et al. (2019) find that, after a merger, both the 
merging entities and their competitors innovate less,  
especially in markets with high pre­merger R&D intensity. 
Igami and Uetake (forthcoming) exploit the consolidation 
of the hard disk drive industry to establish a causal link, 
and Bloom et al. (2016) use Chinese imports as a proxy for 
competition faced by European firms. They show that firms 
facing higher levels of Chinese import competition apply 
for more patents, raise their IT intensity, and increase their 
overall level of productivity. However, Autor et al. (forth­
coming), taking the same approach, show that for publicly 
listed companies in the U.S., increased competitive pressure 
reduced investment in R & D and decreased output of inno­
vation (measured by patent grants).
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1.2 Aim and Structure
In this study, we address the question of the relationship 
between price markups and productivity, emphasizing the 
different roles of direct and indirect effects. To obtain a 
measure for competition, we follow the approach by De 
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and estimate price markups 
for the years 2007 through 2016 from a sample of more 
than 12,000 German firms.8 Interpreting higher price 
markups as evidence for less competition (or less expo­
sure to competition), we are able to study the relationship 
between competition and productivity at the firm level.9  
We complement this information with firm­level innova­
tion data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel to separate 
the direct effect of competition on firm­level productivity 
(holding innovation constant) from the indirect effect  
(by way of endogenous innovation).
After describing our empirical set­up in Section 2 and the 
data in Section 3, we present our main results in three 
sections: In Section 4, we provide a detailed account and 
summary of our estimated price markups. In Section 5, we 
examine the simple relationship between price markups and 
productivity	–	keeping	innovation	constant.	In	Section 6,	
we explicitly model innovation as both a determinant of 
productivity and a function of price markups to separately 
estimate the direct effect and the indirect effect of price 
markups (as proxy for competition) on productivity.
1.3 Key Findings
We find that average price markups across all (included) 
industries	in	Germany	are	at	30-45 percent	and	thus	 
significantly lower than for the U.S. (De Loecker et al., 
2020), but in line with estimates for Europe (De Loecker 
and Eeckhout, 2018; Cavalleri et al., 2019). Over the course 
of our sample, markups exhibit a positive trend. The finan­ 
 
8 This approach has been used in a large number of papers. A few  
examples are Edmund et al. (2015), De Loecker and Scott (2016),  
Altomonte et al (2018), Stiebale and Vencappa (2018), Weche and 
Wambach (2018), van Heuvelen et al. (2019), Autor et al. (2020),  
and De Loecker et al. (2020).
9 We present most of our results as the relationship between produc­
tivity and markups. Throughout the paper, however, we keep the 
working assumption that higher markups are associated with less 
competition and higher industry concentration. This assumption  
allows for the interpretation of our results as “relationship between 
productivity and competition” or “relationship between productivity 
and industry concentration” and thus provides for a better link to the 
existing literature discussed above.
cial crisis did not have a strong negative effect on econ­
omy­wide average price markups in Germany, although 
we observe sector­specific differences of the effects. Price 
markups in manufacturing (which are at economy­wide 
average levels) and trade (which are below average levels) 
did not decline during the financial crisis, whereas markups 
in services (which are above economy­wide average) 
dropped by roughly 20 percentage points, but more than 
bounced back since. Furthermore, we observe an increase 
in price markups across the entire firm­level distribution 
– not simply a further increase in markups by firms that 
already exhibit high markups.
We further show that smaller firms exhibit, on average, 
higher price markups – a pattern we observe in most 
industries. One potential explanation for this relationship 
between price markups and firm size is the degree of com­
petitive exposure from a broader rather than a narrower 
business focus. We find that firms with a narrow business 
focus that are active in only a few markets (niche firms that 
are on average smaller) exhibit higher markups than firms 
with a broader business focus. 
We find mixed results for the association of productivity 
and price markups across different sectors. First, price 
markups explain productivity to varying degrees. The effect 
size for firms in manufacturing, where firm­level variation 
in	markups	explains	about	20 percent	of	the	variation	in	
productivity, and in the trade sector, where this number 
increases	to	almost	40 percent,	is	large	(Cohen,	1988).	 
In services, where the percentage of the variation in firm­
level productivity that is attributable to price markups is  
a	6-7 percent,	the	effect	size	is	medium.
Second, for firms in manufacturing and trade, we find that 
higher markups are associated with lower productivity, and 
this relationship is fairly constant over time. When using 
lagged price markups to explain concurrent firm­level 
productivity, we estimate (negative) productivity­markup 
elasticities of about 2.2 (manufacturing) and 3.8 (trade), 
meaning	that	a	1 percent	increase	in	price	markups	results	
in	a	2.2 percent	decrease	in	firm-level	productivity.	These	
results imply that more competition is associated with 
higher productivity. Our results for manufacturing and 
trade are in line with the “quiet­life hypothesis” (Hicks, 
1935) or the notion of “X­inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966) 
and comport with recent empirical findings (Schmitz,  
2005; Matsa, 2011; Bloom et al., 2019; Backus, 2019). For 
services, we find mixed results – depending on the produc­
tivity measure used in our estimations. The positive pro­
ductivity­markup elasticity we find when using labor  
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productivity comports with the arguments brought forward 
by Autor et al. (2020) or Hsieh and Rossi­Hansberg (2019).
In a last step, we explore a firm’s innovation activity as 
an additional potential indirect channel through which 
price markups affect firm­level productivity. We estimate 
a system of equations (one explaining productivity as a 
function of markups and innovation and one explaining 
innovation as a function of markups) and obtain estimates 
for the direct effect of price markups on productivity and 
the indirect effect by way of innovation. In manufacturing 
and trade, the direct effect is negative and in line with the 
conventional view that more competition increases pro­ 
ductivity. In the services sector, the estimated direct effect 
is positive and at odds with the conventional view but in 
line with the work by Autor et al. (2020) or Hsieh and  
Rossi­Hansberg (2019). The indirect effect of price 
markups on productivity is negative in the manufacturing 
and services sector – more competition lowers innovation 
expenditure which in return lowers productivity. In man­
ufacturing, the negative indirect effect is relatively small 
but reinforces the negative direct effect. In services, on the 
other hand, the negative indirect effect is sizable and par­
tially offsets the positive direct effect. For the trade sector, 
we do not find a significant indirect effect and conclude 
that a firm’s innovation activity does not contribute to the 
effect of competition (or the lack thereof) on productivity.
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One characteristic of this definition is that any values 
above unity imply above­marginal­cost pricing associated 
with some degree of a firm’s market power.11 For instance, 
a markup value of 1.5 means that the firm operates at a 
50 percent	markup.	In	the	sequel,	we	briefly	introduce	the	
approach we take to obtain price markup data at the firm 
level. More details including a discussion of the limitations 
of this approach can be found in the appendix.
Price markups are not directly observed in any firm­level 
data but have to be estimated. Our estimation of price 
mark ups closely follows De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). 
They use a cost­minimization framework to recover price 
markups as a function of the output elasticity of a variable 
production factor (e. g., labor) and the cost share of that pro­
duction factor (over the firm’s revenue).12 Both components 
can be estimated using firm­level financial data. It is this 
latter feature and the fact that the approach is not very data 
demanding that makes it attractive for empirical analysis.
For the estimation of price markups, we begin by assum­
ing that firms produce with a given production technology, 
represented by a function Qit (•):
(2)  Qit    =  Qit   (Xit
1 , …, Xit
V, Kit, ωit)
 
 
11 This definition is different from the more commonly used one in, for 
instance, the literature of industrial organization. In this literature, 
price markups are often defined through the Lerner index, that is, 
the ratio between the profit margin Pit  – MCit and the price Pit (Tirole, 
1988:66).
12 In principle, the choice of labor or material as the variable production 
factor should not affect the estimation results. In a recent (and  
unpublished) working paper, Raval (2019) rejects this notion, finding  
that markups estimated using labor and materials do not exhibit  
the same distributions. Van Heuvelen et al. (2019) also apply both  
approaches with divergent results. They argue these differences  
may stem from adjustment costs otherwise not accounted for in the 
estimation.
2 Constructing Price Markups and  
Measures for Productivity
In this section, we discuss the construction of the key vari­
ables for our main analysis. We estimate price markups as  
a measure of a firm’s price­cost margin. This measure  
both captures a firm’s ability to raise prices above marginal 
cost (market power) and, when averaging over the entire 
industry, serves as a proxy for industry concentration.10 
Both concepts are related to the degree of competition. 
Higher price markups (suggesting more market power for 
the firm) are typically associated with weaker competition 
(within the firm’s market) to which the firm is exposed. 
Likewise, higher industry concentration (that is, concen­
tration of the market in which the firm is active) is associ­
ated with weaker competition. Following the approach by 
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we obtain price markups 
at the firm level, which allows us to study the firm’s 
response to its exposure to competition (or lack thereof)  
as well as the industry’s overall degree of competition.  
The response we are interested in is the firm’s productivity, 
that is, the efficiency of its use of input factors to produce 
output. We also construct and estimate two different meas­
ures of productivity: labor productivity and total factor 
productivity.
2.1 Price Markups
For the purposes of this report, we define the price markup 
as the ratio of output prices Pit over marginal production 
cost MCit where i is the index for a firm and t is time:
(1)  μit  
     Pit       = ––––––
        MCit
10 For a discussion of the use of price markups (or, the Lerner index) as 
a measure for market power, in particular in the context of competi­
tion policy, see Motta (2004:115­7). Using simple oligopolistic models 
(e. g., a Cournot model with n firms that produce a homogeneous good 
at constant marginal cost), one can show that the average degree of 
market power (measured as the price markup or Lerner index) is  
directly and positively related to the degree of industry concentration 
(measured as the Herfindahl­Hirschman Index, HHI). For the formal 
steps, see Motta (2004:123­4).
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Higher values of this measure imply higher levels of output 
per unit of labor – simply translating into higher produc­
tivity of labor.13 We make adjustments to this measure in 
two directions. First, we do not observe physical output 
(Y) but use sales revenue (turnover) as a proxy for physical 
output. Our labor productivity measure is thus defined as:
(6)  Labor Productivityit
     Revenueit                                      = –––––––––
                                                   Lit
Second, we apply a correction of sales revenue to control 
for random shocks.14 By the first adjustment, our labor pro­
ductivity measure is revenue based. This is relevant when 
studying the relationship between productivity and price 
markups (as proxy for competition), as markups can be 
associated with both production efficiency as well as rev­
enue efficiency. For instance, as predicted by Hicks (1935) 
or Leibenstein (1966), higher markups are associated with 
less production­efficient firms. At the same time, however, 
higher markups are also expected to be associated with 
higher revenue (given constant output), implying higher 
revenue­efficiency. These two channels give rise to an 
ambiguous effect of price markups on productivity when 
using a revenue­based measure. To address this problem, 
we also use total factor productivity, which we obtain from 
our production function estimates.
For our second measure, we follow De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012:2463) and derive a total factor productivity 
measure as by­product of our production­function estima­
tion (as the first step of the estimation of price markups). 
It is the difference between the estimated expected output 
of firm and the predicted output for the firm using the 
estimated production function coefficients. This difference 
must then be the unexplained productivity of firm i. This 
second productivity is to a lesser degree subject to the same 
revenue effects as labor productivity and allows us to con­
sider productivity from a different angle.
13 Note that factors such as process innovation or new management 
practices are likely to affect labor productivity.
14 It is the same correction applied to the labor cost share in the context 
of price­markup construction, as described in equation (32) in the  
appendix, following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012:2449).
Output Qit is function of 1, . . . , V variable inputs X
υ
it the 
capital stock Kit, and an unobserved productivity measure 
ωit. Given the prices for input factors (PX
υ
it ) as well as the 
price for capital rit, and given a fixed output level, firms 
choose a mix of production factors to minimize their pro­
duction costs. We can represent the firm’s cost minimiza­
tion problem in the form of a Lagrangian:
(3)  L (X1it, …, X it
V, Kit, ωit) =  ∑
v
v=1
 P Xvit   X
v
it +  ritKit  + λit  (Qit  – Qit (·))
For a given level output Qit, the Lagrange multiplier λit  
represents the marginal costs of production MCit.  
The first­order condition with respect to a variable  
input X υit can therefore be used to recover the firm’s  
price markup:
(4)  
∂Qit  X
υ
it     
 1   P X
υ
it X
υ
it
––––– –––– = ––––  –––––––––
∂X υit  Qit     λit     Qit
The left­hand side of this equation is the output elasticity 
with respect to the variable input X υit. We denote this output 
elasticity by θυit. After some algebraic manipulation, price 
markups, denoted by μit, can be expressed as:
(5)   
          Pit               P
X υ
it    X
υ
it    –1μit = ––– = θυit  (–––––––)          λit            Pit Qit
          θυit      = ––– 
          αυit
 
 
A firm’s price markup is therefore equal to the output elas­
ticity θυit of a variable input and the cost share α
υ
it (over the 
firm’s revenue) of that input. The former we obtain from 
an estimated production function (following the approach 
in Ackerberg et al. (2015)), the latter from financial state­
ments.
2.2 Productivity Measures
We use two measures for productivity: labor productiv­
ity and total factor productivity (TFP). Both measures are 
meant to capture how efficient input factors are converted 
into outputs (Hulten, 2001).
Our first measure is labor productivity. A broad body of liter­
ature (Gal, 2013:17) defines labor productivity as gross out­
put Yit divided by labor (e. g., number of employees) Lit:
Labor Productivityit
     Yit                                      = –––
                                           Lit
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3 Data Sample for Markup Estimation
For our estimation of price markups, we use data from 
Germany for the years 2006 through 2016.15 We obtain 
our main estimation sample from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database.16 Relevant for our purposes of estimating price 
markups and productivity measures, the database contains 
balance sheet as well as income statements. We further col­
lect information on a company’s industry classification and 
the legal form. In Table 1, we provide a list of the respective 
variables and their definitions. 
3.1 Sample Construction
Our estimation sample is an unbalanced panel over the 
period 2006 to 2016 and comprises 11,963 firms with an 
average number of 6,629 firms per year. When interpret­
ing the following results, one should keep in mind that our 
sample is selective. Sample selection is due to two reasons. 
First, legal reporting rules imply that small firms are gen­
erally underrepresented.17 And second, we impose the fol­
lowing sampling restrictions that are partly driven by our 
chosen methodology: 
15 Because of the use of one­year lagged variables in our price­markup 
estimation procedure, we obtain values for price markups for the 
years 2007 through 2016.
16 For Germany, Bureau van Dijk obtains its data from Creditreform  
and Creditreform Rating AG. The database covers approximately 
63 percent	of	all	German	firms	(Kalemli-Ozcan	et	al.,	2015).
17 Medium sized and large firms are obligated to report balance sheet  
information, a statement of income, and notes on the accounts.  
Small firms are exempt from the reporting requirements of a  
statement of income. Following the definition in §267 Handels ­ 
gesetzbuch, firms are assigned to each of these size categories if  
at least two of the following criteria are satisfied. For small firms: 
number	of	employees	≤	50;	turnover	≤	9,680,000	euros;	total	assets	
≤	4,840,000 euros.	For	medium firms: between 50 and 250 employees; 
turnover	between	9,680,000 euros	and	38,500,000	euros;	total	assets	
between	4,850,000 euros	and	19,250,000	euros.	For	large firms: more 
than	250 employees;	turnover	>	38,500,000;	total	assets	>	19,250,000.	
These definitions were in place until 2015. We use them for our  
entire sample.
1. We include data only from unconsolidated accounts. 
2. Firms with missing values for any of the variables listed 
in Table 1 are dropped from our sample. Moreover, we 
include only firms with at least 20 employees18 and firms 
that report turnover (revenue) of at least 100,000 euros 
per year. 
18 With respect to the coverage of Orbis as a function of the number  
of employees, Calligaris et al. (2018) find: “Current analysis compar­
ing administrative data sources and Orbis confirms indeed that for the 
group of firms employing more than 20 workers, Orbis covers a larger 
portion of the population of firms than for the sample including firms 
of all sizes”
TABLE 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Description
Sales (Output Y) Net sales or turnover
Number of employees 
(Labor L)
Total number of employees on the 
company’s payroll
Cost of employees  
(Labor costs LC) 
All costs of employees  
(including pension costs)
Tangible fixed assets 
(Capital K)
Tangible assets  
(buildings, machinery, etc.) 
Material costs  
(Material costs M)
Costs of goods purchased  
(including raw materials and  finished 
goods but excluding services)
Nace Rev. 2 main section Nace main section
Nace Rev. 2,  
Primary code(s) 
Primary four-digit Nace code  
(group) reported 
Nace Rev. 2,  
Secondary code(s)
Secondary four-digit Nace code  
(group) reported (if applicable)
Legal form Reported national legal form  
of the company 
Region German federal state (Bundesland) 
List of variables obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database,  
with the variable name as used in Orbis and a short description of the data.  
We also provide the respective notation used for the description  
of the markup estimation in Section 2.
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significantly smaller number of firms and observations.23 
At the sector level, we observe large differences in absolute 
sample size. In Table 2, we provide the number of firms and 
number of observations for sectors manufacturing, trade, 
and services. Manufacturing and trade are the two most 
populated sectors (Nace sections). 
The vast majority of firms in our sample are limited liabil­
ity companies (GmbH or GmbH & Co. KG).	About	92 percent	
of our sample firms have this legal form. Only a small share 
of	5 percent	of	all	firms	in	the	sample	are	corporations	or	
public limited companies (Aktiengesellschaft, AG). We pro­
vide a breakdown of our sample by legal form in Table 3.24 
In Table 4, we provide basic descriptive statistics of the 
main variables used in our analysis. The average firm in 
our sample has (deflated) revenue of more than 90 million 
euros, a capital stock (tangible assets) of 14 million euros, 
and about 315 employees. It incurs 15 million euros for its 
labor input and 51 million for its material input. Moreover, 
78 percent	of	the	observations	in	our	sample	are	by	firms	
that report a secondary Nace code indicating that these 
firms operate in multiple markets. 
As mentioned earlier, our estimation sample is not neces­
sarily representative of the sample contained in the Orbis 
database. In Table 4, we further report results from balanc­
ing tests, comparing the means of our variables of interest 
across samples. All reported differences are statistically 
23 Estimated values at the boundaries of our sample are therefore to be 
treated with caution.
24 Legal form is constant. We do not observe any changes of legal form 
throughout our sample period.
3.	 We	restrict	our	estimation	sample	to	firms	from	8 Nace	
Rev.2 sections: manufacturing, trade, and 6 business­ 
related services sections that we combine to a “services” 
sector.19
4. Our sample period is from 2006 through 2016.20 
5. We include only firms with observations for at least two 
consecutive years. This stems from a requirement of our 
estimation procedure.
6. We drop firms that exit and later re­enter our raw  
sample.21
7. We drop observations that are imputed by Bureau van 
Dijk (most prominently in the years 2012­2014).
8. In order to remove outliers that might drive our esti­
mation results, we winsorize our sample by dropping 
observations with values of capital and material costs in 
the upper and lower 0.5 percentiles and values of output 
in the upper 0.1 percentile.22 
Our sample does not contain data on physical inputs and 
output (except for the number of employees). Instead,  
we observe the necessary variables in terms of their value 
in euros. To render observations comparable across time, 
we deflate all monetary values that are reported in nomi­
nal euros. We provide more information on our approach 
(including sources for our deflators) in the appendix.
3.2  Basic Descriptive Statistics of  
Estimation Sample
Our estimation sample exhibits a fairly stable number of 
firms per year – both for the full sample and for each sec­
tor – for the years 2007 through 2015. The first (2006) and 
the last (2016) years in our sample, however, come with a 
19 The 8 Nace sections are: Manufacturing (C); Wholesale and retail 
trade (G); Transportation and storage (H); Accommodation and food 
service activities (I); Information and communication (J); Real estate 
activities (L); Professional, scientific and technical activities (M);  
and Administrative and support service activities (N). In the appendix, 
we further provide some results for sections Mining and quarrying 
(B); Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply (D); Water 
supply, sewerage, waste management (E); and Construction (F).  
For more information on Nace Rev.2, see the Eurostat manual at 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS­RA­
07­015­EN.PDF.
20 We restrict our sample to exclude the years before 2006 due to the 
unavailability of producer price indices (used to deflate our data) for 
specific sectors.
21 The reverse does not apply: we retain firms that enter and later exit 
our sample.
22 Here, we follow best practice approaches. See, for instance, Hall and 
Mairesse (1995).
TABLE 2: Number of Firms and Observations  
by Sector (Nace Section) 
Nace Section Firms Observations
Manufacturing (C) 5,435 33,942
Trade (G) (Wholesale and retail trade) 3,671 22,521
Services (Nace sections H, I, J, L, M, and N) 2,857 16,453
Total 11,963 72,916
The table contains the total number of firms and the total number of observations 
for Nace sections Manufacturing (C), Trade (G) and the combined services  
(Nace sections H, I, J, L, M, and N). In Table 17 in the appendix, we provide numbers 
for each individual Nace Section used in the estimation sample. 
Source: Numbers based on data obtained from 
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and authors’ own 
calculations.
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different from zero. Our estimation sample comprises firms 
that have higher revenue, that are larger (in both assets and 
employment), and that pay more for their labor and input 
compared to the Orbis raw sample. This selection of larger 
companies into our estimation sample ought to be taken 
into account when interpreting the results of this report.25
25 This selection problem is not unique to our report but applies to other 
studies using Orbis (or similar) data. Note that whether or not this 
non­representativeness has implications for how representative of all 
German firms our estimation sample remains an open question.
TABLE 4: Sample Difference
Estimation Orbis
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Difference
Revenue (in mio.) 91.81 219.90 27.72 591.90 64.09 ***
Capital stock (in mio.) 14.20 67.55 6.27 125.80 7.93 ***
Employees 313.60 1,984.00 88.52 1,234.00 225.10 ***
Labor costs 15.84 85.92 8.96 118.90 6.88 ***
Material costs 51.51 108.60 46.71 969.40 4.80 ***
Secondary Nace code reported 0.78 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.03
Observations 72,916 184,919
The table reports means and standard deviations and provides a comparison of our main variables for our estimation sample and the Orbis raw sample.  
The last column lists the difference in means. Revenue, capital stock, and input costs (in monetary values) are in 1,000,000 (deflated) euros. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Numbers based on data obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and authors’ own calculations.
TABLE 3: Number of Firms by Legal Form
Legal Form Firms %
Limited liability company (GmbH) 9,005 75.3
GmbH & Co. KG 2,014 16.8
Corporation / PLC (AG) 616 5.2
Registered cooperative 184 1.5
Other 144 1.2
Total number of firms 11,963 100.0
The table lists the number of firms in our estimation sample by their legal form. The figure on the right 
visualizes these numbers. Numbers based on data obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and 
authors’ own calculations. 
Source: Numbers based on data obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and authors’ own calculations.
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4 Estimated Price Markups for Germany 
(2007–2016)
et al. (2019) estimate average markups in Germany of about 
15 percent	for	the	time	period	covered	in	this	report	–	and	
similar values for Europe. Moreover, our estimates are 
significantly lower than those reported for the U.S. For 
instance, De Loecker et al. (2020) estimate price markups of 
61 percent	(for	2016),	and	Autor	et	al.	(2020)	find	markups	
of	80 percent	(for	2012).
Our results add a number of new or refined observa­ 
tions. First, we see a weak decline during the financial  
crisis – at the beginning of our sample period – for the 
revenue­weighted averages (our main measure of interest). 
Note, however, that this observation is very sector­specific 
and driven by services. We provide more details further 
below.
Second, the revenue­weighted average shows an increase 
of price markups by about 12 percentage points since 2009. 
Recall from our earlier discussion that our estimation sam­
ple comprises a significantly smaller number of observa­
tions in the first and last year of our sample window. When 
excluding the first and last year from our markup estimates 
(and thus relying on the years with larger numbers of 
annual firm observations), we must conclude that price 
markups in Germany have seen a very moderate increase. 
Our	point	estimates	show	an	increase	of	about	4 percent	
between	2009	and	2015	(or	2 percent	between	2007	and	
2015). This observation is consistent with the findings by 
Weche and Wambach (2018) or Cavalleri et al. (2019) who 
find fairly stable markups. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), 
on the other hand, estimate an increase of price markups 
(for	Europe)	by	26 percent	for	the	period	of	2010	through	
2016, a significantly stronger increase than what we 
observe for Germany in that same time period.
Third, we observe that revenue­weighted averages of price 
markups are lower than the simple means. This implies 
higher markups for firms of smaller size. We provide 
more evidence of this further below. We also observe that 
markups for the average firm (i. e., the simple mean) and 
In this section, we present our estimates for price markups 
for Germany in the years 2007 through 2016. For the esti­
mation, we use the number of employees as variable input, 
take a structural value­added approach with a Cobb­Doug­
las production function, and estimate production functions 
at the sector level.26 For the results presented in this sec­
tion, we trim the 1st and 99th percentile.27
4.1 Time Trends for Price Markups
In Figure 1, we present average price markups obtained 
for our estimation sample (for manufacturing, trade, and 
services). The blue line depicts simple (arithmetic) means, 
whereas the green line depicts revenue­weighted averages. 
The former represents the price markups of a typical – or 
“average” – firm. Moreover, revenue­weighted average 
markups (as representation of the average markup taking 
the weight of the respective firm into account) are defined 
as 
(7)  
                                              Yit                                  YitAverage markupt = ∑ ––––– · Markupit = ∑ ––– · μit = ∑sit · μit 
                                                    i   ∑j Yjt                           i      Yt                    i
where Yit is firm revenue in t. The denominator ∑ j Yit  = Yt 
denotes the sum of revenues of all firms j in year t so that 
the fractional expression captures a firm’s revenue­based 
market share sit. 
We find that, on average across all sectors, price markups 
in	Germany	range	between	approximately	30-45 percent.28 
These values fall within the range of estimates reported by 
other authors. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) find average 
price	markups	of	35 percent	for	Germany	in	2016.	Cavalleri	 
26 For more implementation details, see the appendix.
27 This approach is a common practice to eliminate the influence of  
outliers on the results (Weche and Wambach, 2018; van Heuvelen  
et al., 2019; De Loecker et al., 2020).
28 We consider these figures for the revenue­weighted averages more 
relevant as large firms with more sales (and higher impact on  
consumers and the economy as a whole) enter with more weight.
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FIGURE 2: Average Price Markups by Sector (Nace Section)
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The figure presents the revenue-weighted average price markups (with weights calculated at the sector level) for manufacturing, trade, and services.  
Blue lines depict the results for estimates from sector-specific production functions; green lines depict the results from the assumption of a uniform  
production function across all sectors. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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The figure presents the average price markups for manufacturing, trade, and services. The green line depicts average price markups weighted 
by firms' revenue, μt = Σi  sit μit  with sit =–– Yit Yt  and Yt = Σj  Yjt ; the blue line depicts a simple (arithmetic) mean. For the calculation of price markups, 
we use the coefficients from sector-specific production function estimates using a structural value-added approach with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. For the calculation of means, estimated price markups are winsorized (bottom and top percentile). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Manufacturing Trade Services
21
Price Markups, Innovation, and Productivity: Evidence from Germany
aggregate markups (i. e., the weighted average) grow at 
similar pace. We therefore do not find any support for  
the prediction and findings in Autor et al. (2020), where 
aggregate markups rise more quickly because of increasing 
market shares and markups for the largest firms  
(e. g., “superstar firms”). 
The observations from Figure 1 hold for our total estima­
tion sample, averaging across manufacturing, trade, and 
services – each with their sector­specific production tech­
nologies and competitive environments. Observed patterns, 
however, are very sector­specific. We explore this in Fig­
ure 2,	where	we	present	average	price	markups	separately	
for each of the three sectors. The blue line depicts these 
sector­specific price markups. Compared with the econ­
omy­wide average markups (30­45 %), we find higher 
markups in services (60­85 %) and lower markups for trade 
(15­20 %). Price markups for manufacturing are at econ­
omy­wide average levels. This last finding is inconsistent 
with the results in Cavalleri et al. (2019) who find lower 
than average markups in manufacturing.
Examining the time trends, we observe stronger than 
average trends for manufacturing and a fairly stable devel­
opment of markups over time for trade. For services, we 
see a decline of price markups of more than 20 percentage 
points during the financial crisis in 2007­2009 (in the early 
years of our sample period), a pattern we do not observe 
for manufacturing or trade. The initial decrease in econo­
my­wide average markups observed in Figure 1 is therefore 
fully attributable to services. In fact, the services sector 
did not recover from the drop in price markups during the 
financial crisis until 2015. 
The green lines in Figure 2 depict average price markups 
when assuming a uniform production technology across all 
sectors. The juxtaposition of markups based on sector­spe­
cific production technologies (our preferred method) and 
the alternative with uniform technologies allows us to 
examine the estimation “bias” from using a uniform pro­
duction technology across all sectors. We observe signifi­
cantly higher price markups for sector­specific production 
technologies than for uniform technologies in manufac­
turing and trade and lower markups in services. Moreover, 
without a sector­specific approach, the decline in markups 
during the financial crisis would be significantly smaller  
in size.
4.2 Price Markups by Firm Size
In Figure 3, we present results for price markups for dif­
ferent firm sizes: small (blue lines), medium (green lines), 
and large (yellow lines). In panel (a) on the left we plot  
levels of markups, whereas in panel (b) on the right we  
plot the cumulative change in markups. 
From the left panel of Figure 3, we can see that price 
markups decrease in firm size: smaller firms exhibit higher 
markups than large firms.29 Price markups of small firms 
as well as large firms are affected the most by financial  
crisis in 2007­2009, whereas medium­sized firms do  
not exhibit any decrease in markups during that period.  
In fact, markups are monotonically increasing throughout  
our sample period. Price markups for small firms drop 
from	80 percent	in	2007	to	below	70 percent	in	2012	before	
increasing back to pre­crisis level in 2016. We observe a 
similar pattern for large firms that return to pre­crisis 
markup levels in 2015.
One potential driver behind the markup level patterns by 
firm size are differences across sectors. For instance, only 
8 percent	of	firms	that	qualify	as	small	firms	belong	to	
the	trade	sector,	compared	to	26 percent	and	30 percent	in	
medium firms and large firms, respectively. Trade is also a 
sector with low average price markups. This distributional 
pattern implies lower markups for larger­sized firms. Note, 
however, that these patterns across sectors cannot fully 
explain the differences in the markup levels across firm­
size group as we observe the same firm­size patterns within 
sectors.	In	Table 5,	we	report	average	markups	by	sector	
and firm size. Average price markups are decreasing in firm 
size for all three sectors. 
Another potential explanation of why small firms exhibit 
higher level of markups is that those small firms compete 
in more specialized niche markets (with lower degrees 
of competition). In Figure 4, we plot average markups 
(panel (a)	on	the	left)	and	the	cumulative	change	(panel	(b)	
on the right) for firms that report only a primary 4­digit  
Nace group (green lines) as well as firms that report both  
a primary and secondary group (blue lines). The former  
subsample of firms we consider as more specialized firms 
being active in relatively niche markets. On average, 
22 percent	of	firms	in	our	sample	belong	to	this	group	of	
specialized firms. We see that specialized firms exhibit 
29 Note that average markups (dotted lines in Figure 3) trace the 
markups for large firms. This is because average markups are  
revenue­weighted, with markups of large firms with higher weights.
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FIGURE 3: Average Price Markups by Firm Size
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2007 2008 20102009 20122011 2013 2014 2015 2016
0.90
0.94
0.98
1.02
1.06
1.10
2007 2008 20102009 20122011 2013 2014 2015 2016
W
ei
gh
te
d
 A
ve
ra
ge
 M
ar
ku
p
(a) Markup Levels Levels  (b) Cumulative Change
 Small  Medium  Large  Average markup 
The figures depict the revenue-weighted average price markups in panel (a) and the cumulative change in panel (b) (with 2007=1)  
for three different firm-size categories. Data are for manufacturing, trade, and services. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1.  
Size classes are defined based on § 267 Handelsgesetzbuch, see Footnote 17 in Section 3.1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
FIGURE 4: Average Price Markups by Degree of Specialization
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The figures depict the revenue-weighted average price markups (panel (a)) and the cumulative change (panel (b), with 2007=1) for firms reporting  
only a primary 4-digit Nace group (green lines) as opposed to firms that report both a primary and secondary group (blue lines). Data are for  
manufacturing, trade, and services. Size of subsamples varies over time. Average number of firms with only a primary reported Nace group: 1,294.  
Average number of firms with both a primary and a secondary reported Nace group: 4,394. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
(b) Cumulative Change(a) Markup Levels
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higher markups than firms with broader business activities 
(in panel (a) on the left). With specialized firms on average 
being smaller than firms with broader business activities, 
this result adds another potential explanation to why small 
firms exhibit higher markups. 
4.3 Firm-Level Distribution of Price Markups
In order to obtain a better understanding of markup trends 
at the firm level, in Figure 5, we plot kernel density esti­
mates of the firm­level distributions of unweighted price 
markups for the years 2007 (blue line) and 2016 (green 
line). We find that the variance of the firm­level distribu­
tion has increased. We can further see from the figure that 
the distribution as a whole has shifted to the right. We thus 
observe a general increase in price markups across all lev­
els of price markups, and not simply a further increase in 
markups by firms that already exhibit high markups. 
Kernel density estimates of unweighted markups, of course, 
do not account for revenue weights. In order to better com­
pare distributional differences to our revenue­weighted 
average	price	markups	(presented,	for	instance,	in	Figure 1), 
we plot different moments of the distribution of revenue­ 
TABLE 5: Average Price Markups by Sector  
and Firm Size
Firm Size
Nace Section Small Medium Large
Manufacturing 1,561 1,410 1,342
Trade 1,779 1,284 1,206
Services (Nace sections  
H, I, J, L, M, and N) 1,869 1,700 1,573
The table reports revenue-weighted average price markups by sector for three 
different firm size categories. Data are for manufacturing, trade, and services.  
For the definitions for firm size, see Footnote 17. For more estimation details, see 
the notes for Figure 1. Authors’ own calculations.
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
FIGURE 5: Firm-level Distribution of Price Markups
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This figure depicts kernel density plots of the distributions of unweighted price markups for firms in 2007 (blue line) and 2016 (green line)  
for manufacturing, trade, and services. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.   
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FIGURE 7: Decomposition of Price Markups
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This figure presents the results of the decomposition exercise (De Loecker et al., 2020) in equation (8) for manufacturing, trade, and services.  
We plot the change in price markups D μt  and its three components: the change of markups within a given sector, the markup-relevant change  
of the composition of a given sector, and a cross-term capturing both of these first two effects. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
FIGURE 6: Cumulative Changes of Price Markups Across the Distribution
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This figure presents the time paths of different moments of the distribution of revenue-weighted average price markups (2007=1)  
for manufacturing, trade, and services. We plot the 10th (yellow), 50th (green), and 90th percentiles (blue) of the revenue-weighted  
firm-level markups over time, calculating the respective percentiles on an annual basis and thus allowing firms to move within the distribution  
given their respective markup ranking. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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that, for our sample of Germany, increases in price markups  
are driven by increases of markups across all firms – some 
firms disproportionately outperforming others in terms of 
price markups (e. g., “superstar firms” as in Autor et al. 
(2020)) does not seem to play an important role.
4.5 Competition and Exposure to Competition
Price markups at the firm level capture a firm’s ability  
to raise price above marginal cost. More pricing power 
(i. e., market power) implies that a firm is less constrained 
by competitive forces within its market. As such, price 
markups are a measure for the degree of a firm’s exposure 
to competition. In Table 6, we show regression results that 
establish a link between the firm­level exposure to com­
petition (through a firm i estimated markup) and indus­
try­level competition (proxied by the industry’s leave-one-
out mean of price markups).30 We explore if a decrease in 
industry­level competition is associated with a decrease 
in a given firm’s exposure to competition (that is, a higher 
price markup). 
In columns (1) and (3) of the table, we report the results  
for industry averages calculated at the 2­digit Nace level 
(divisions) and 3­digit Nace level (classes), respectively.  
In columns (2) and (4), we report results for industry aver­
ages (as explanatory variables) at the respective Nace levels 
and for the federal state (Bundesland) that firm i is located 
in. In a U.S. context, Rossi­Hansberg et al. (2020) argue 
that regional concentration ratios are more meaningful for 
the prevailing market structures than nationwide ratios,  
as most product markets have to be defined regionally.  
To account for potential prevalence of regional (rather than 
national) competition for this exercise, we construct aver­
age markups at the Bundesland level in columns (2) and (4).
For manufacturing and trade, we find positive associations  
between industry­level markups and a given firm’s mark up, 
supporting the idea that firm­level and industry­level 
measures of competition move hand­in­hand. Note, how­
ever, that elasticities are ­ across the board – less than 
unity. An increase in industry average markups (“competi­
tion”) does not one­to­one translate into higher firm­level 
markups („exposure to competition” or “market power”). 
30 Industry’s leave­one­out average means that the industry average 
associated with firm i is calculated using all but firm i’s observation:  
                                                         Yjtleave –one–out meanit = ∑ ––––– μjt ∑sjtμjt, 
                                                                       j≠i  ∑k
 Ykt               j≠i
 
with Yit firm i’s revenue in t.
weighted price markups in Figure 6). More specifically,  
we plot cumulative markup changes for the 10th (lower 
decile – yellow line), 50th (median – green line), and  
90th percentiles (upper decile – blue line) of the firm­ 
level price markup distribution. The figure allows us to 
explore the different time paths of different parts of that 
distribution. 
We can see that firms at the top of the distribution (blue 
line) with high markups are also those that experienced 
a sharper drop during the financial crisis. Their markups 
level did not return to pre­crisis levels (2007) until 2016. 
Unlike firms with high markups, firms with lower markups 
returned to pre­crisis levels around the year 2013.
4.4 Decomposition of Price Markups
Are changes in price markups a result of an across­the­
board change of markups within an industry? Or does the 
sector composition change in a way so as to affect average 
price markups? To answer these questions, we follow the 
approach in De Loecker et al. (2020) and decompose the 
change in average price markups, Δμt, as a function of 
three components: the change of markups within a given 
sector, the markup­relevant change of the composition of a 
given sector, and a cross­term capturing both of these first 
two effects. Formally, this decomposition is captured by the 
following formula:
(8)  
                   Yi,t–1                                   Yit                         Yit
Δμt = ∑–––––– Δ μst  +∑μs,t–1 Δ ––– +∑Δμst Δ –––              s    YS,t–1                 s                YSt         s               YST
               ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩       ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩      ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
                      Δ within                     Δcomposition                 Δcross-term
 
with Yst =  ∑i ∍sYit the revenue share of sector S over the 
entire sample. The first component, Δ within, is the change 
in price markups that is due to a change of the average 
price markup at a given sector. The second component, 
Δ composition, is the change in price markups due to the 
change in the composition of the sector (e. g., when the 
share of firms with higher price markups increases). The 
third component, Δ cross­term, captures a joint effect of 
the former two. 
In Figure 7, we plot the results of this composition exercise. 
The total effect Δμt is depicted by the yellow line. The first, 
second, and third components are depicted by the dark 
blue, and light blue lines, respectively. We can see that  
both the sector composition (green line) and the joint effect 
(light blue line) have a minor influence on the change in 
average markups. The primary factor of Δμt are changes in 
markups within a given sector (dark blue line). This means  
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4.6 Productivity Measures
For our main results (in the next Section 5), we use two 
productivity measures: total factor productivity and labor 
productivity. In Figure 8, we plot time series of these two 
measures separately for each industry. Total factor produc­
tivity (TFP) is depicted by the blue line; labor productivity 
is depicted by the green line. We normalize both series with 
We also find stronger associations when industry averages 
are calculated at the national level (in columns (1) and (3)) 
rather than at the federal­state level (in columns (2) and 
(4)). These findings suggest that (for our estimation sam­
ple), defining product markets at the regional level is not 
as relevant as argued, e. g., for the U.S. by Rossi­Hansberg 
et al.	(2020).
TABLE 6: Firm-Level Markups vs. Industry Averages
2-Digit Nace 3-Digit Nace
Dependent variable: ln (Markupit)
Industry 
(1)
Industry x Bundesland 
(2)
Industry
(3)
Industry x Bundesland 
(4)
Panel (a): All Sectors
ln (Average markupt) 0.2330*** (0.0320) 0.0561*** (0.00634) 0.1240*** (0.0154) 0.0428*** (0.00786)
Observations 56,884 55,568 56,894 56,850
Firms 11,298 11,080 11,302 11,298
Adj. R2 0.084 0.072 0.064 0.062
Panel (b): Manufacturing
ln (Average markupt) 0.4940*** (0.0591) 0.0602*** (0.00606) 0.6150*** (0.0409) 0.0747*** (0.0136)
Observations 26,636 26,059 26,637 26,610
Firms 5,148 5,065 5,149 5,144
Adj. R2 0.212 0.160 0.161 0.149
Panel (c): Trade
ln (Average markupt) 0.6900*** (0.0597) 0.0548*** (0.0126) 0.8750*** (0.122) 0.0742*** (0.0188)
Observations 17,582 17,565 17,582 17,579
Firms 3,484 3,479 3,484 3,484
Adj. R2 0.069 0.054 0.065 0.054
Panel (d): Services
ln (Average markupt) 0.1320*** (0.0273) 0.0513*** (0.0101) 0.0197 (0.0262) 0.0225* (0.0115)
Observations 12,678 11,912 12,679 12,644
Firms 2,710 2,571 2,710 2,704
Adj. R2 0.084 0.082 0.074 0.074
The table reports (unbalanced) panel fixed effects regression results with the natural log of firm i’s markup as dependent variable and log of industry average markup as explanatory 
variables. Further controls (not reported) include log of firm i’s assets, firm and year fixed effects. Industry average for price markups are at the 2-digit Nace level (column (1)),  
at the 2-digit Nace x federal state (Bundesland) level (column (2)), at the 3-digit Nace level (column (3)), and at the 3-digit Nace x federal state (Bundesland) level (column (4)).  
Industry averages are leave-one-out means: the industry average associated with firm i is calculated using all but firm i’s observation. We report regression results for the subsample 
of firms in manufacturing, trade, and services. For more estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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the year 2007 as the base year (and values equal to 1). As for 
depiction of average price markups in the previous section, 
we present revenue­weighted productivity measures: 
(9)  
                                                        YitAverage productivityt = ∑ –––––– · Productiviyit
                                                               i    ∑j Yjt
where Yit is firm i’s revenue in t so that the fractional 
expression captures a firm’s revenue­based market share. 
For both manufacturing and trade we see a close relation­
ship between total factor productivity and labor produc­
tivity. For services, on the other hand, the two time series 
exhibit substantial differences. Overall, our firm­level pro­
ductivity measures are highly correlated with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.77 (reported in Table 7). Figure 8 further­
more confirms a long­run slowdown for both productivity 
measures in all three sectors over the period 2007 to 2016. 
In all three sectors the normalized value of productivity in 
2016 is below 1, implying a decline in productivity com­
pared to 2007. In manufacturing and trade it has only been 
in the very recent years that productivity rises again though 
it is still below the 2007 value. While labor productivity  
FIGURE 8: Productivity Estimates by Sector (Nace Section)
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This figure presents the time series for the (revenue-weighted) averages of the two productivity measures used in this report:  
total factor productivity – TFP (blue line) and labor productivity (green line). Data is for manufacturing, trade, and services.  
For an introduction of both measures, see Section 2.2. Values are normalized (within each sector), with the values for 2007 equal to 1.  
For the calculation of means, productivity measures are winsorized (bottom and top percentile). 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
has been fairly stable over the period in services, it is much 
more volatile for TFP, and furthermore TFP shows a declin­
ing trend in services since 2013 as well.
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5 Baseline Relationship between  
Price Markups and Productivity 
5.1 Price Markups and Productivity:  
Simple Associations 
5.1.1 Descriptive Evidence 
Simple linear correlation coefficients, such as those reported 
in Table 7, suggest a negative relationship between pro­
ductivity and price markups. For the total economy (man­
ufacturing, trade, and services), the coefficient for price 
markups and labor productivity is –0.2, the coefficient 
for price markups and total factor productivity is –0.31. 
The correlations are strongest for firms in the trade sec­
In this section, we present results on the baseline relation­
ship between productivity and markups. We refer to these 
results as “baseline” as they do not yet explore underlying 
mechanisms. The reported effects represent a combined 
effect of markups on productivity. The results are based on 
our full estimation sample for manufacturing, trade, and 
services. In Section 6 below, we will add innovation to the 
picture to show if this combined effect stems from, e. g., 
managerial incentives that may be weaker for firms that 
face less competitive pressure (direct effect) or arises by way 
of innovation (indirect effect). 
We address the question from a number of different angles. 
In Section 5.1, we first explore the relationship between 
price markups and productivity in a static sense – show­
ing both descriptive evidence and results from a simple 
regression analysis where we juxtapose today’s productivity 
and today’s price markups. The result from this first step 
should be interpreted as the correlation between markups 
and productivity but not as a causal link from markups to 
productivity. The key concern against a causal interpre­
tation of the results in this first step is reverse causality. 
That is, it might be that we find a correlation between the 
two variables not because markups affect productivity but 
because productivity affects markups. In order to alleviate 
this endogeneity concern, we examine the intertempo­
ral link between markups and productivity in Section 5.2, 
presuming that lagged price markups are a determinant of 
firm­level productivity. Ideally, this second step allows us 
to draw causal conclusions on the effect of markup on pro­
ductivity.
TABLE 7: Pairwise Correlations
Markup Labor Productivity
Panel (a): Total Economy
Labor Productivity – 0.198***
Total Factor Productivity – 0.313*** 0.766***
Panel (b): Manufacturing
Labor Productivity – 0.425***
Total Factor Productivity – 0.437*** 0.998***
Panel (c): Trade
Labor Productivity – 0.619***
Total Factor Productivity – 0.600*** 0.977***
Panel (d): Services
Labor Productivity 0.229***
Total Factor Productivity – 0.231*** 0.413***
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for firm-level price markups 
and the two productivity measures (both in natural logarithm scale) for the total 
economy (manufacturing, trade, and services) and separately for each of the sectors. 
*** indicates statistical significance (different from 0) at the 1 percent level. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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FIGURE 9: Productivity and Price Markups
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This figure offers a visualization of the negative correlation coefficients presented in Table 7. In panel (a) on the top, we present data for labor  
productivity; in panel (b) on the bottom, we present data for total factor productivity. Data are for manufacturing, trade, and services (total economy).  
The figures on the left present scatter plots of the average productivity for different values of price markups (in bins of ascending value).  
The figures on the right provide box plots of the productivity distribution for each markup decile. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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tor (–0.62 and –0.60) and weakest in services. In fact, for 
firms in services, price markups and labor productivity 
exhibit a positive correlation whereas price markups and 
total factor productivity exhibit a negative correlation. We 
will explore these patterns in greater detail further below. 
In Figure 9, we explore the relationship graphically for 
labor productivity (top panel) and total factor productivity 
(bottom panel). The two graphs on the left of Figure 9  
plots the average productivity for a given bin of price 
markups.	Except	for	price	markups	with	values	less	than 1	
(meaning that prices are below cost; depicted by vertical 
lines) and sufficiently high values (i. e., markup values 
above	2,	so	that	markups	are	100 percent	and	higher),	we	
find that higher markups are associated with lower aver­
age productivity. We also observe a higher variance for the 
lowest markup deciles (and for total factor productivity also 
the highest decile), as can be seen in the box plots of the 
productivity distribution for each price markup decile in the 
figures on the right. This means that for firms with price 
markups that are not in the tails of their distributions, the 
negative relationship between markups and productivity is 
robust.
5.1.2 Evidence from Regression Models 
The positive correlation between markups and productivity 
seen in the descriptive analysis might be driven by other 
underlying factors such as industry or time. We therefore 
employ multivariate regression analyses that allow us to 
control for other factors that might affect firm­level produc­
tivity. The goal is to make ceteris-paribus statements: all else 
equal, how are price markups associated with productivity? 
We begin with a simple static analysis, exploring the con­
temporaneous relationship between productivity of a given 
firm in a given period and the degree of competition (proxied 
by price markups) that firm faces in that same period. To 
this end, we estimate the following empirical model:
(10)  ln (Productivityit) = f (ln(Markupit), •).
It states that productivity is a function of price markups as 
well as other factors, represented by (•). For our empirical 
results, we control for year and industry effects to cap­
ture time and industry variation in productivity that is not 
associated with price markups. For the convenient inter­
pretation of our estimated coefficients as elasticities, we 
use both productivity and markup measures in logarithmic 
scale. The interpretation of our estimation coefficients 
as elasticities implies statements of the type: “an increase 
of price markups by 1 percent is associated with an increase/
decrease of productivity by x percent.” It is important to keep 
in mind that, with the above specification, we do not yet 
make any causal statements.
In Table 8, we present the estimation results for the model 
in equation (10). Columns (1) and (3) contain results for 
pooled OLS estimations, adding dummies for 2­digit Nace 
codes (divisions) and year to control for variation across 
industries and time. Columns (2) and (4) contain results 
for unbalanced panel fixed­effects estimations. We report 
results for the sectors manufacturing in panel (b), trade in 
panel (c), and services in panel (d). In panel (a), we report 
results for all three sectors combined. 
Our estimation results show a negative relationship between 
price markups and firm­level productivity, confirming our  
descriptive analysis from above.31 When considering the 
data for the total economy (i. e., manufacturing, trade, and  
services),	a	1 percent	increase	in	price	markups	is	associated	 
with	a	1.3 percent	(pooled	OLS	specification)	to	0.2 percent	
(panel specification) decrease in productivity. These results 
are statistically significant and robust for both productiv­
ity measures. We observe some variation of these results 
across sectors. In both manufacturing and trade the rela­
tionship between markups and productivity is negative, 
with elasticities of ­2.2 and ­4.2 for the pooled OLS spec­
ification and ­0.8 and ­2.3 for the panel specification. The 
results imply that, after controlling for industry and time 
variation, we still find that more competition (at a given point 
in time) is associated with higher productivity at that time. 
The robust negative association observed for firms in man­
ufacturing and trade does not carry over to firms in the 
service sector. As we show in panel (d) of Table 8, markups 
and productivity exhibit a positive association in most of 
our specifications. The structural differences between man­
ufacturing and trade on the one hand and services on the 
other hand, observed for linear correlations in Table 7 are 
present even after controlling for industry and time varia­
tion. 
Price markups explain firm­level productivity to varying 
degrees across sectors. For firms in manufacturing, the 
firm-level	variation	in	markups	explains	about	20 percent	
31 As we report in Table 18 in the appendix, the estimated elasticities are 
constant over time. The interaction terms with year dummies are sta­
tistically insignificant except for manufacturing in the years 2015 and 
2016 (implying a weaker negative association relative to earlier years).
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Overall, when averaging over the total economy (panel (a) 
of the table), the variation in price markups explains about 
10 percent	to	15 percent	of	the	variation	of	firm-level	pro­
ductivity (a medium to large effect size).33 
33 The effect size is determined by Cohen’s f, which is equal R2/1–R2  
to where R2 is the value for “Adj. R2 (markups only)” from the re­
gression table (Cohen, 1992). Effect sizes (i. e., values off f) of 0.1, 
0.25, and 0.40 are considered small, medium, and large, respectively 
(Cohen, 1988).
of the variation in productivity.32 Price markups exhibit a  
significantly higher explanatory power in trade, where  
this	figure	exceeds	40 percent.	Following	Cohen	(1988),	the	 
effect size for manufacturing and trade is considered large. 
In services, on the other hand, the effect of price markups 
in explaining productivity is of medium size. The per­
centage of the variation in firm­level productivity that is 
attributable	to	price	markups	is	at	6 percent	to	7 percent.	
32 See the reported numbers for “Adj. R2 (markups only).” These are the 
R2 numbers from pooled OLS models with ln (Markupit) as the only 
explanatory variable.
TABLE 8: Regression Results (Associations)
Labor Productivity TFP
Dependent variable:
ln (Productivityit)
Pooled OLS
(1)
Panel FE
(2)
Pooled OLS
(3)
Panel FE
(4)
Panel (a): Total Economy (Observations: 56,894; Firms: 11,302)
ln (Markupit) – 1.276*** (0.0452) – 0.232*** (0.0402) – 1.425*** (0.0464) – 0.271*** (0.0405)
Adj. R2 / R2within 0.359 0.038 0.600 0.038
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.097 0.153
Panel (b): Manufacturing (Observations: 26,637; Firms: 5,149)
ln(Markupit) – 2.187*** (0.0632) – 0.766*** (0.0609) – 2.225*** (0.0617) – 0.802*** (0.0604)
Adj. R2 / R2within 0.329 0.120 0.334 0.124
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.193 0.203
Panel (c): Trade (Observations: 17,582; Firms: 3,484)
ln(Markupit) – 3.930*** (0.0965) – 2.064*** (0.1380) – 4.198*** (0.1140) – 2.294*** (0.1560)
Adj. R2 / R2within 0.503 0.227 0.480 0.227
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.425 0.402
Panel (d): Services (Observations: 12,679; Firms: 2,710)
ln(Markupit) 0.153*** (0.0399) 0.401*** (0.0381) – 0.047 (0.0400) 0.360*** (0.0343)
Adj. R2 / R2within 0.255 0.134 0.810 0.126
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.073 0.062
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Firm FE
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No 
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
The table reports results from pooled OLS and unbalanced panel fixed-effects regressions. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of productivity (either labor productivity or 
total factor productivity, where the latter is obtained from the production-function estimation in log scale). Independent variable of interest is the  natural logarithm of firm-level price 
markups. Reported coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. Year and industry dummy variables are added as additional control variable in all specifications (as indicated). We report 
regression results for the total economy (manufacturing, trade, and services) in panel (a) and separately for the three subsamples in panels (b)-(d). Manufacturing (1-digit Nace code C) 
comprises 2-digit Nace codes 10-33, trade (G) comprises Nace codes 45-47 and "services"-related sections comprise Logistics (H: 49-53), Accommodation & food services (I: 55-56), 
IT (J: 58-63), Real estate (L: 68), Professional (M: 69-75), and Administration (N: 77-82). For more markup estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. For OLS: standard errors clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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TABLE 9: Regression Results (Intertemporal Relationship)
Dependent variable: 
ln(Productivityit)
Labor Productivity
(1)
TFP
(2)
Labor Productivity
(3)
TFP
(4)
Panel (a): Total Economy (Observations: 45,428 / 36,489)
ln (Average markupi,t-1) – 1.320*** (0.0500) – 1.468*** (0.0518)
ln(Average markupi,t-2) – 1.341*** (0.0542) – 1.493*** (0.0564)
Adj. R2 0.361 0.597 0.359 0.590
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.097 0.151 0.094 0.148
Panel (b): Manufacturing (Observations: 21,340 / 17,229)
ln (Average markupi,t-1) – 2.148*** (0.0679) – 2.186*** (0.0663)
ln (Average markupi,t-2) – 2.100*** (0.0734) – 2.140*** (0.0718)
Adj. R2 0.321 0.325 0.308 0.312
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.178 0.188 0.167 0.178
Panel (c): Trade (Observations: 14,031 / 11,297)
ln (Average markupi,t-1) – 3.933*** (0.108) – 4.217*** (0.129)
ln (Average markupi,t-2) – 3.903*** (0.116) – 4.198*** (0.138)
Adj. R2 0.485 0.450 0.472 0.453
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.405 0.385 0.389 0.371
Panel (d): Services (Observations: 9,921 / 7,833)
ln (Average markupi,t-1) 0.1210*** (0.0438) – 0.0747* (0.0442)
ln (Average markupi,t-2) 0.1120** (0.0473) – 0.0884* (0.0478)
Adj. R2 0.255 0.816 0.256 0.816
Adj. R2 (markups only) 0.073 0.068 0.074 0.070
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
The table reports results from pooled OLS regressions with year and industry FE. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of productivity. Independent variable of interest  
is the natural logarithm of the once and twice lagged firm-level price markups (ln(Markupi;t-1) and ln(Markupi;t-2)). Reported coefficients are interpreted as elasticities.  
Year and industry dummy variables are added as additional control variable in all specifications. For more markup estimation details, see the notes for Figure 1. For more details  
on the regression sample, see the notes for Table 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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We present results from pooled OLS regressions in 
Table 9.36 Our earlier findings in Table 8 for simple asso­
ciations continue to hold. We find a significantly negative 
relationship between price markups and firm­level produc­
tivity. With the lagged time structure in the specification 
in equation (11), however, we can now conclude that price 
markups have a negative effect on productivity. For the total 
economy (manufacturing, trade, and services combined), 
a	1 percent	increase	in	price	markups	lowers	productivity	
by	1.3 percent	(labor	productivity)	to	1.5 percent	(TFP).	The	
effects do not vary greatly with the time lag. In fact, the 
estimated elasticities in Table 9 (in columns (1) and (2) for 
markups in t–1 and columns (3) and (4) for markups in 
t–2) are very close in magnitude to the elasticities reported 
in Table 8 (in columns (1) and (3)). Moreover, price 
markups in t–1 (and t–2) explain similar percentages of 
the variation in firm­level productivity.
Our findings suggest that pro­competitive policies (with 
the effect of curbing firm’s market power and lowering 
firm­level price markups) have the potential to increase 
firm­level productivity. This policy implication applies 
to both the manufacturing and trade sector for which we 
find a negative effect of price markups on productivity. As 
with the earlier results reported in Table 8, the situation 
is different when considering services. When using labor 
productivity, we find a positive effect of price markups on 
productivity.	The	effect	is	small	(a	1 percent	increase	in	
price markups increases productivity by 0.1 %) but precisely 
estimated. When using TFP as the productivity measure, 
the effect is negative and statistically significant (at the 
10 % level), but even smaller in magnitude.
The estimated effects of price markups on productivity are 
combined effects and represent our baseline results. They 
are as such not indicative of any underlying mechanisms. 
To explore these mechanisms, in the next section, we add 
a firm’s innovation activity to the equation to disentangle 
the combined effects and separately estimate a direct effect 
(taking available technology as given) and an indirect effect 
(by endogenizing a firm’s innovation activity).
36 Because we estimate our main models with innovation in the next 
section using pooled OLS specifications, we restrict attention to this 
estimation strategy in this table.
To summarize our first set of results, we find that for 
manufacturing and trade, more competition is positively 
associated with higher productivity (assuming that higher 
markups imply less competition). This relationship is 
reversed in the services sector. Moreover, the role that  
price markups play in explaining the firm­level variation  
is strongest in trade and weakest in services.
5.2 Price Markups and Productivity: 
Intertemporal Relationship
The estimated model in equation (10) and the respective 
results in Table 8 do not allow for any causal interpretation  
in a sense that markups determine productivity. The reported  
associations are potentially subject to a reverse­causality 
problem. This means, while we estimate productivity as a 
function of markups (and other factors), presuming that 
markups determining productivity, the true relationship 
could reversed and productivity determines markups.34
To address concerns of reverse causality, we estimate 
the model in equation (10) using once/twice lagged price 
markups as our explanatory variable of interest. This yields 
the following estimation specification:
(11)  ln (Productivityit) = f (ln(Markupi, t–τ), •)    τ = 1,2
The value τ  =  1 means that we estimate this year’s pro­
ductivity as a function of last year’s price markups. Sim­
ilarly, with τ  =  2, we postulate that price markups affect 
productivity with a two­year delay. Given these time lags, 
reverse causality is no longer of concern and under certain 
assumptions the estimated coefficients identify the causal 
effect of lagged markups on productivity.35 We use again 
both productivity and markup measures in logarithmic 
scale and interpret our estimated coefficients as elasticities, 
allowing for statements of the type: “an increase of price 
markups by 1 percent lead to an increase/decrease of next year’s 
productivity by x percent.” 
 
 
 
34 In fact, other authors have estimated such a reversed relationship, 
explaining markups as a function of productivity (e. g. Altomonte et 
al., 2018).
35 The key assumption is that the error term in equation (11) is not  
correlated over time (no autocorrelation). 
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6 The Role of Innovation 
The target population spans all legally independent firms 
with five or more employees and their headquarters located 
in Germany. A firm is defined as the smallest combination 
of legal units operating as an organizational unit producing 
goods or services. The MIP is a random stratified sample, 
stratified by eight size classes, two regions (East and West 
Germany) and 56 Nace 2­digit industries. The industries 
covered by the MIP include manufacturing, mining, energy 
and water supply, construction, trade and services. As for 
our estimation of price markups, we restrict the sample to 
manufacturing, trade, and services. The MIP is furthermore 
designed as a panel; that means, it allows tracking firms 
over time. However, since participation is voluntary, the 
panel is unbalanced. Every second year the MIP represents 
the German contribution to the Europe­wide harmonized 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) under the coordina­
tion of Eurostat.
6.1.2 Matched Orbis-MIP Sample 
MIP data and Orbis data (as used in our markup estima­
tions) can be matched via the Bureau van Dijk identifica­
tion number (BvDID). For the period 2007­2016, we merge 
6,776 firm­year observations. For these observations, we 
have information whether firms have introduced product 
or process innovations. For a smaller subset of firms, we 
additionally have information on innovation expenditure 
and R & D expenditure. We describe our innovation variables 
below. 
Comparing the matched sample with the non­matched 
Orbis sample, we find that the matched sample contains 
on average lager firms but with lower productivity, both 
in terms of labor productivity and TFP. However, the two 
samples	do	not	significantly	differ	at	the	5 percent	level	
in price markups. We report the mean value for these key 
variables in the matched Orbis­MIP sample and the non­
matched (full) Orbis estimation sample in Table 10.
The literature has discussed two key explanations of a posi­
tive effect of competition on productivity. On the one  
hand, more competition may give rise to managerial prac­
tices that employ the firm’s resources more efficiently 
(“quiet­life hypothesis” (Hicks, 1935) or the notion of 
“X­inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966)).37 Competition is 
said to have a direct effect on productivity. This explanation 
takes the firm’s access to technology (and the technological 
status quo) as given. The second explanation endogenizes 
the available technology: higher competition may create 
incentives for the firm to innovate, and more innovation in 
return is said to have a positive effect on productivity (Hall, 
2011; Mohnen and Hall, 2013; Peters et al., 2017). Follow­
ing this second explanation, competition has an additional 
indirect effect on productivity. In this section, we disentan­
gle the combined effect presented in Table 9 to explore the 
relative importance of the direct and indirect effect.
6.1 Innovation Data
6.1.1 Mannheim Innovation Panel
In order to investigate the indirect effect markups might 
have on productivity via innovation, we use the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP) as the second main data source. 
The MIP is an annual representative survey that collects 
information about firm’s innovation activities. The sur­
vey methodology and definitions of innovation indicators 
follows the Oslo manual on innovation surveys (OECD and 
Eurostat, 2019), thereby yielding internationally compa­
rable innovation data. The MIP has been conducted by the 
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, 
in cooperation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
and Innovation Research (ISI) and the Institute for Applied 
Social Sciences (infas), on behalf of the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) since 1993.  
37 For recent empirical results, see Schmitz (2005), Matsa (2011), Bloom 
et al. (2019), or Backus (2019).
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TABLE 10:  Characteristics of Matched Sample
Variable
Matched
Orbis-MIP Sample
Non-Matched
Orbis Sample
Mean Diff Test
(p-value)
ln (Employees) 5.622 5.024 0.000 ***
ln (Labor Productivity) 12.316 12.572 0.000 ***
ln (TFP) 12.206 12.592 0.000 ***
ln (Markup) 0.318 0.313 0.145
The table reports means of key variables (natural logarithms of employees as an indicator for firm size, labor productivity, total factor productivity TFP, and price markups) for the 
matched Orbis-MIP sample and the non matched (full) Orbis estimation sample. Both samples contain data for manufacturing, trade, and services. The mean values of ln (employees) 
correspond to an average number of employees of about 276.3 in the matched sample and 152.0 in the non-matched Orbis sample. *** p < 0.01
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
TABLE 11: Regression Results (Intertemporal) for Matched Orbis-MIP Sample
Dependent variable: 
ln(Productivityit)
Labor Productivity
(1)
TFP
(2)
Labor Productivity
(3)
TFP
(4)
Panel (a): Total Economy (Observations: 6,532 / 5,369; Firms: 1,962/1,699)
ln (Markupi,t-1) – 0.463*** (0.095) – 0.680*** (0.093)
ln (Markupi,t-2) – 0.468*** (0.105) – 0.697*** (0.102)
Panel (b): Manufacturing (Observations: 4,385 / 3,617; Firms: 1,301/1,135)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 1.910*** (0.175) – 1.940*** (0.175)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 1.834*** (0.193) – 1.856*** (0.194)
Adj. R2 0.327 0.332 0.312 0.316
Panel (c): Trade (Observations: 652 / 528; Firms: 207/180)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 3.589*** (0.374) – 3.552*** (0.440)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 3.681*** (0.393) – 3.622*** (0.455)
Adj. R2 0.453 0.409 0.457 0.406
Panel (d): Services (Observations: 1,495 / 1,224; Firms: 454/384)
ln(Markupi,t-1) 0.357*** (0.081) 0.057 (0.103)
ln(Markupi,t-2) 0.365*** (0.091) 0.037 (0.108)
Adj. R2 0.349 0.780 0.347 0.782
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
The table reports results from pooled OLS panel regressions for the matched sample of ZEW’s MIP and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. Dependent variable is the natural  
logarithm of productivity. Independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the once and twice lagged firm-level price markups (ln(Markupi,t-1) and ln(Markupi,t-2)).  
Reported coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. For more estimation details, see the notes for Table 8. Note that Nace section Accommodation & food services (I: 55-56)  
is not covered by MIP data and therefore dropped from the matched sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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6.2 Baseline Results with Matched Sample
We re­estimated equation (11) with our matched sample  
and report the results for the effects of once / twice lagged 
price markups on firm­level productivity in Table 11. We 
use markup and productivity estimates based on the full 
Orbis data. We find that the estimated effects of price 
markups on productivity in the matched sample are 
slightly weaker than those found in the full Orbis sample. 
For manufacturing, the markup­productivity elasticity is 
approximately ­2.2 in the full Orbis sample and ­1.9 in the 
matched sample. For trade, the numbers are ­4.2 and ­3.6. 
For services, the estimates for labor productivity are in line 
with those obtained in Table 9. When total factor produc­
tivity is used, the results are insignificant for services in the 
matched sample. 
The results in Table 11 represent the combined effect of 
price markups on productivity for the matched sample and 
serve as a benchmark for the remainder of this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Productivity and Innovation 
For the separation of the direct and indirect effect of 
markups on productivity, we first explore each step in the 
two­step mechanism of the indirect effect. The first step 
is the effect of competition (proxied by price markups) on 
innovation, the second step is the effect of innovation on 
productivity.
6.3.1 Innovation Variables
For our analysis, we add four key innovation variables from 
the MIP. We provide summary statistics in Table 12. First, 
we use the natural logarithm of a firm’s R & D expenditure 
(ln(R & DExpit)). R & D expenditure captures what a firm i 
spends on intra­ and extramural R & D activities in a given 
year t. R & D is creative work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge and the 
subsequent use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications, such as new and improved products and pro­
cesses. To deal with firms that do not invest in R & D and 
for which ln(R & DExpit) would not be defined, we follow 
two approaches. First, we replace ln(R & DExpit) by zero for 
these firms and add a dummy variable to the specification 
that equals 1 when the firm does not invest in R & D. Alter­
natively, we add 1 euro to R & D expenditure for each firm. 
Both approaches gives qualitatively the same results. 
TABLE 12: Innovation Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
R & D (0/1) 3,642 0.501 0.500 0.000 1.000
ln (R & D Expit) for R & D Expit > 0
a) 1,823 14.183 2.301 6.908 19.743
ln (R & D Expit) for R & DExpit > 0, 0 o. w.
b) 3,642 7.099 7.277 0.000 19.743
ln (R & D Expit+1) c) 3,642 9.400 5.059 4.605 19.743
Innovation (0/1) 3,784 0.620 0.485 0.000 1.000
ln (InnoExpit) for InnoExpit > 0 2,347 14.707 2.193 6.908 20.093
ln (InnoExpit) for InnoExpit > 0, 0 o. w. 3,784 9.122 7.344 0.000 20.093
ln (InnoExpit+1) 3,784 10.871 5.198 4.605 20.093
Productit (0/1) 6,776 0.625 0.484 0.000 1.000
Processit (0/1) 6,766 0.568 0.495 0.000 1.000
The table reports summary statistics for the innovation variables in the matched Orbis-MIP sample. a) reports log R & D expenditures only for those firms with positive R & D 
expenditure; b) reports log R & D expenditures for all firms, assuming a value of log R & D of zero for all firms without R & D; c) reports log R & D expenditures for all firms,  
assuming a value of log (R & D +1) for all firms without R & D. Similarly for innovation expenditure.
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
37
Price Markups, Innovation, and Productivity: Evidence from Germany
6.3.2 Effect of Price Markups on Innovation
In a first step, we examine the effect of price markups on 
a firm’s innovation decision. We estimate the following 
model:
(12)  Innovationit  =  f  (ln (Markupi,t–1), •).  
Innovation in a given period t is a function of price 
markups in the previous period, among other factors. To 
account for variation across industries and across time, we 
include industry and year dummies in our estimation spec­
ifications. We also include a measure of firm size to control 
for size effects. 
In Table 13, we report the results of lagged price markups 
on four different innovation variables. In models (1) and 
(2), our dependent variables are (the natural logarithm) 
of a firm’s innovation expenditures (ln(InnoExpit + 1)) and a 
firm’s R & D expenditures (ln(R  &  DExpit + 1), respectively. 
The use of natural logarithms allows us to interpret the 
results as elasticities. In models (3) and (4), the dependent 
variables are binary variables indicating whether the firm 
has made product or process innovation in the previous 
three­year period t to t–2, respectively. The estimated 
coefficients (divided by 100) approximately indicate the 
change in the predicted probability of a firm i introducing a 
Second, instead of using R & D expenditure, we take innova­
tion expenditure of firm in year t to construct ln(InnoExpit).  
The innovation expenditure is the sum of all current 
expenses for innovation (personnel, material, etc.) as well 
as investments associated with these innovation activities. 
Innovation expenditure is a broader concept. In addition 
to R & D expenditure, it includes outlays for acquisition of 
external knowledge, machines and equipment, training, 
market introduction, design, and other preparations for 
product and/or process innovation activities in a given year. 
On	average,	R	&	D	expenditure	amounts	to	50-60 percent	of	
innovation expenditure.38 We use the same approaches as 
for R & D also for firms without innovation expenditure. 
Finally, in addition to the input­related expenditure varia­
bles, we use two binary output­related indicators Productit 
and Processit that equal 1 if the firm has introduced a new 
product (including services) or a new production technol­
ogy or method of delivery in the three­year period t to t–2, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
38 A concept even broader than innovation expenditure is knowledge  
capital (Corrado et al., 2005). For a cross­country comparison of 
knowledge capital in different industries see Belitz and Gornig (2019).
TABLE 13: Effect of Competition on Future Innovation
Total
(a)
Manufacturing
(b)
Trade
(c)
Services
(d)
Model (1): Dep. Var.: ln(InnoExpit) (Observations: 3,149; Firms: 1,278)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 1.706*** (0.629) – 3.723** (1.261) – 1.010 (2.360) – 1.935*** (0.749)
Adj. R2 0.307 0.318 0.045 0.318
Model (2): Dep. Var.: ln(R & DExpit) (Observations: 3,045; Firms: 1,258)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 1.596*** (0.561) – 4.140*** (1.394) 0.343 (2.175) – 1.694*** (0.613)
Adj. R2 0.351 0.351 0.011 0.397
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
The table reports results from pooled OLS panel regressions for the matched sample of ZEW’s MIP and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. Reported are results for four alternative 
definitions of innovation. Model (1) and (2) use the natural logarithm of innovation and R & D expenditure, respectively. It is defined as ln (R & D Expit + 1) and ln (Inno Expit + 1)  
in order to account for zero innovation activity. Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. In model (3) and (4), product and process innovation are dummy variables related  
to the 3-year period t to t – 2. Coefficients divided by 100 can be interpreted as the change in the predicted probability of a firm i introducing a new product or process in response  
to a 1 percent increase in the firm’s price markups. The number of observations / firms refers to the sample for the total economy (manufacturing, trade, and services). Independent 
variable of interest is the natural logarithm of  firm-level price markups in year t – 1. Firm size (proxied by ln(Assetsit)) is added as an additional control variable. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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6.3.3 Effect of Innovation on Productivity
In a second step, we estimate a model of productivity as  
a function of lagged price markups and lagged innovation, 
allowing both variables to co­determine firm­level produc­
tivity. The estimated equation is an extension of equation 
(11), in which we did not explicitly account for innovation 
as a driver of productivity. The extended model we estimate 
is as follows:
(13)  ln(Productivityit)  =  f  (ln (Markupi,t–1), Innovationi,t–1, •).  
We report results for four different innovation variables 
and across three different sectors in Table 14. Our depend­
ent variable is total factor productivity. First, we find that 
innovation has a positive effect on productivity when look­
ing at the expenditure measures (in models (1) and (2)). 
The	estimated	elasticities	state	that	a	1 percent	increase	in	
either innovation expenditure or R & D expenditure increase 
productivity	by	0.05 percent	to	0.08 percent.	These	esti­
mated effects are statistically significant and well in line 
with results obtained in the literature, ranging between 
0.02 percent	and	0.10 percent	(Peters	et	al.,	2018).	The	
effect is present for the total economy and manufacturing 
as well as services (for innovation expenditure). 
Our results for product and process innovation dummies 
are less clear. In contrast to other studies using MIP data 
(e. g., Peters et al., 2017), we find no significantly positive 
effect of the introduction of a new product or process on 
productivity in the manufacturing sector. For services, we 
find a positive effect for both variables.40 
As we have already observed in Table 13, there are no 
innovation­related effects in the trade sector. Innovation 
expenditure, R & D expenditure, and the process innovation 
dummy exhibit a statistically insignificant coefficient. The 
introduction of a new product even has a negative effect 
on firm­level productivity. As discussed earlier, we believe 
these patterns are the result of lower levels of innovation 
activities in the trade sector in combination with the small 
sample size for that sector.
Combining  the results from both steps – the effect of 
markups on innovation as first step and the effect of  
innovation on productivity as second step – we can con­
clude that the conjectured indirect effect of price markups 
on productivity by way of innovation is indeed a viable 
40 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the effect of innova­
tion and productivity, see Hall (2011) and Mohnen and Hall (2013).
new	product	or	process	in	response	to	a	1 percent	increase	
in the firm’s price markups. We report our results for the 
total economy (column (a)) as well as, separately, for man­
ufacturing (b), trade (c), and services (d).39
A few interesting patterns emerge. First, the effects of 
price markups on the innovation and R & D expenditure 
measures in models (1) and (2) are negative, meaning that 
more competition has a facilitating effect on innovation 
(expenditures). For the total economy, our results imply 
a	1.7 percent	and	1.6 percent	decrease	in	innovation	and	
R	&	D	expenditures,	respectively,	in	response	to	a	1 percent	
increase in markups. We observe the strongest effect in 
manufacturing,	with	elasticities	suggesting	that	a	1 percent	
increase in price markups decreases innovation and R & D 
expenditures	by	3.7 percent	and	4.1 percent,	respectively.	
The effect for services is about half as strong but also sig­
nificant. For trade, we do not find a statistically significant 
effect of markups on firms’ innovation activities. This 
might be the result of lower levels of innovation activities 
in the trade sector (especially with regard to R & D) in com­
bination with the small sample size for that sector.
Second, price markups exhibit a significantly negative  
effect on firm’s decision to introduce a new product 
(model (3))	but	no	effect	on	process	innovation	(model	(4)).	
The coefficient for the total economy of ­0.158 indicate 
that	a	10 percent	increase	in	markups	lowers	the	likelihood	
of introducing a new product by approximately 0.016 per­
centage points. Given an overall product innovation rate 
of 0.625, the size of the effect is rather small. For product 
innovation, the negative effect of price markups is of sim­
ilar size for manufacturing and services, but, similar to the 
expenditure variables, we do not find a statistically signifi­
cant effect for the trade sector.
Our results add to a long list of articles that have studied 
the effects of competition on innovation. Recent contribu­
tions with results in line with ours are Bloom et al. (2016) 
(using Chinese imports as a proxy for competition faced 
by European firms), Aghion et al. (2018) (providing results 
from laboratory experiments), and Igami and Uetake 
(forthcoming) (empirically exploiting the consolidation 
 of the hard disk drive industry). 
 
 
39 The reported results are from linear probability models. Regression 
results from probit models show very similar marginal effects.
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determinant of productivity. Notice that, once we control for 
innovation in the productivity estimation to capture  
the indirect effect, our estimates for the direct effect of price 
markups on productivity do not change much. The esti­
mated elasticities for price markups in Table 14 are analo­
gous to the coefficients reported in column (2) of Table 11. 
Comparing the combined effect of markups on productivity 
as estimated following equation (11) (not controlling for 
innovation) with the effects estimated following equation 
(13) (controlling for innovation), we find quantitatively 
similar results. For these estimates, we have estimated the 
direct productivity effect of markups assuming innovation 
to be exogenously given. In the next section, we allow for 
innovation to be endogenously determined.
6.4 Joint Estimation of Innovation and 
Productivity
In order to estimate direct and indirect effects of com­
petition on productivity, we jointly estimate a system of 
equations of innovation and productivity. The first equation 
describes the impact of competition on innovation, more 
specifically, we explain the innovation (or R & D) expend­
iture in period t–1 by competition (markups) in year t–2 
and a set of control variables:
(14)  ln (Inno/R & D Expi,t–1) = f (ln(Markupi, t–2), •)  
The	second	equation	then	explains	productivity	in	period t 
by competition (markups) and innovation (or R & D) 
expenditure, both measured in period t–1. 
(15)  ln (Productivityit) = f (ln(Markupi,t–1), ln (Inno/R & D  Expi,t–1), •)
While for the results in Table 14, we have assumed innova­
tion to be exogenously given, this system of equations (14) 
and (15) implies that innovation (or R & D) expenditure is 
endogenously determined by lagged markups. Furthermore, 
we allow the error terms of both equations to be correlated.  
TABLE 14: Effect of Competition  and Innovation on Future TFP
Dependent variable:
ln(TFPit)
Total
(a)
Manufacturing 
(b)
Trade 
(c)
Services
(d)
Model (1): Innovation Expenditure (Observations: 2,460; Firms: 918)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.801*** (0.134) – 2.090*** (0.179) – 3.372*** (0.630) 0.114 (0.148)
ln(InnoExpi,t-1) 0.059*** (0.011) 0.061*** (0.011) – 0.021 (0.069) 0.084*** (0.024)
Adj. R2 0.658 0.406 0.390 0.823
Model (2): R & D Expenditure (Observations: 2,335; Firms: 895)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.845*** (0.143) – 2.030*** (0.183) – 3.562*** (0.630) 0.029 (0.172)
ln(R & DExpi,t-1) 0.052*** (0.012) 0.052*** (0.011) – 0.011 (0.100) 0.053 (0.038)
Adj. R2 0.650 0.394 0.417 0.805
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes 
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Yes
The table reports results from pooled OLS panel regressions for the matched sample of ZEW’s MIP and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. Dependent variable is the natural  
logarithm of total factor productivity in year t (obtained from the production-function estimation in log scale). Independent variables of interests are the natural logarithm  
of firm-level price markups and innovation in year t–1. Reported are results for four alternative definitions of innovation. Model (1) and (2) use the natural logarithm of innovation  
and R & D expenditure, respectively. Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. Model (1) and (2) additionally include a dummy variable that is 1 if firm does not invest in innovation 
and R & D, respectively (not reported). In model (3) and (4), product and process innovation are dummy variables related to the 3-year period t–1 to t–3. Coefficients indicate  
the percentage change in productivity when the innovation dummy changes from 0 to 1. The number of observations / firms refers to the sample for the total economy  
(manufacturing, trade, and services). Standard errors are clustered at firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
40
Price Markups, Innovation, and Productivity: Evidence from Germany
separate innovation equation (in equation (12)). We observe 
the starkest difference in manufacturing where the esti­
mated elasticity is ­2.7, as compared to ­3.7 in Table 13. 
This difference means that the reduction of innovation 
expenditure	in	response	to	a	1 percent	increase	in	price	
markups	drops	by	1	percentage	point,	from	3.7 percent	to	
2.7 percent.	When	considering	R	&	D	expenditure	(System	2	
in Tables 15), the results obtained from the two­equation 
system and those from a separate innovation equation are 
virtually the same.
Table 15 provides the information needed for an assess­
ment of the direct and indirect effects of price markups on 
productivity. For ease of exposition in this decomposition 
exercise, we report the respective elasticities in Table 16. 
The combined effect is the estimated coefficient reported 
Overall, this allows to disentangle the direct effect of 
markups on productivity and the indirect effect via innova­
tion. 
We report the results for the system of equations in 
Table 15,	using	innovation	expenditure	(System	1)	and	
R & D expenditure (System 2) as dependent variables in 
equation (14)	[Equation	1]	and	total	factor	productivity	as	
dependent	variable	in	equation	(15)	[Equation	2].	We	also	
report results for the system with labor productivity in 
Table 18 in the appendix. 
Comparing the results in Table 15 (System 1) and Table 13, 
we find that the estimated effect of (lagged) markups on 
innovation expenditure obtained from the two­equation 
system (in equation (14)) is weaker than the effect from a 
TABLE 15: Direct and Indirect Effect of Competition on TFP (System Estimation)
Total
(a)
Manufacturing 
(b)
Trade
(c)
Services
(d)
System 1 – Equation 1: Dep. Var.: ln(InnoExpi,t-1) (Observations: 2,016)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 1.512*** (0.497) – 2.699*** (0.788) – 1.812 (2.244) – 1.594** (0.698)
R2 0.346 0.341 0.104 0.373
System 1 – Equation 2: Dep. Var.: ln(TFPit) (Observations: 2,016)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.789*** (0.072) – 2.088*** (0.104) – 3.080*** (0.486) 0.271** (0.121)
ln(InnoExpi,t-1) 0.052*** (0.007) 0.052*** (0.006) 0.120 (0.098) 0.109*** (0.019)
R2 0.634 0.305 0.429 0.778
System 2 – Equation 1: Dep. Var.: ln(R & DExpi,t-1) (Observations: 1,922)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 1.565*** (0.481) – 4.018*** (0.789) 0.598 (1.959) – 1.714*** (0.568)
R2 0.403 0.381 0.068 0.477
System 2 – Equation 2: Dep. Var.: ln(TFPit) (Observations: 1,922)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.821*** (0.077) – 1.940*** (0.106) – 3.595*** (0.418) 0.411** (0.194)
ln(R & DExpi,t-1) 0.061*** (0.008) 0.051*** (0.006) 0.099 (0.200) 0.219*** (0.056)
R2 0.610 0.303 0.115 0.597
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Yes
The number of observations refers to the sample for the total economy. The table reports results from a two-equation system estimation for the matched sample of ZEW’s MIP  
and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. In System 1, the dependent variable in Equation 1 is the natural logarithm of innovation expenditure in year t – 1; in System 2, the dependent 
variable in Equation 1 is the natural logarithm of R & D expenditure in year t – 1. In both systems, the dependent variable in Equation 2 is the natural logarithm of total factor 
productivity in year t. The indirect effect of competition is captured by the natural logarithm of firm-level price markups in year t – 2 in Equation 1. The direct effect of competition  
is measured via the natural logarithm of firm-level price markups in year t – 1 in Equation 2. Both equations control for year FE and 2-digit industry effects, and Equation 1 additionally 
includes firm size (as ln(Assets)) as control. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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in column (2) of Table 11. The direct effect of competi­
tion is the estimated coefficient for lagged price markups 
in Equation 2 of Table 15. For both innovation variables 
(Systems 1 and 2) and across various sub­samples the two 
productivity­markup elasticities are of the same sign and 
of a similar order of magnitude. For the manufacturing and 
trade sector, our results support the conventional view that 
increased competition raises firm­level productivity, in line 
with work by Schmitz (2005), Matsa (2011), or Bloom et al. 
(2019). 
For the services sector, the combined effect of price mark­
ups in Table 11 (as well as the effect of price markups in 
Table 14 when innovation is assumed to be exogenous) 
is positive but insignificant. With our system estimation 
approach, the (direct) effect is now positive and statistically 
significant. This puts the results for total factor productiv­
ity in line with the earlier results for labor productivity.41  
We find robust evidence for a positive effect of price 
markups on productivity. Put differently, in the services 
sector, increased competition lowers firm­level produc­
tivity. These results are at odds with the conventional view 
but in line with the work by Autor et al. (2020) or Hsieh and 
Rossi­Hansberg (2019). 
 
41 See also Table 20 in the appendix in which we report system­ 
estimation results for labor productivity.
The indirect effect in Table 16 is an approximation, equal 
to the product of the coefficient on price markups in Equa­
tion 1	(Table	15)	and	the	coefficient	on	innovation	in	Equa­
tion 2	(Table	15).42 We report in boldface those indirect 
effects that are based on statistically significant estimation 
coefficients. The figures in Table 16 yield a number of inter­
esting observations from our effect­decomposition exercise.
First, we separately estimate the indirect effect and find 
significant results for manufacturing and the services sec­
tor (as well as for the aggregated total economy). Further­
more, the results are as expected and in line with existing 
literature. The indirect effect of price markups on produc­
tivity is negative – more competition lowers productivity 
because it lowers innovation expenditure which in return 
lowers productivity.
Second, in manufacturing, the indirect effect is small rel­
ative to the direct effect. The difference of the two effects 
is of an order of magnitude of 10 (for R & D expenditure, 
System 2) to 15 (for innovation expenditure, System 1). This 
means, while the indirect effect reinforces the direct effect  
 
42 Consider the following example: the coefficient of price markups  
(in t-2) on innovation expenditure (in t-2) is -2, and the coefficient 
of innovation (in t-1)on productivity (in t) is 0.25. Both coefficients 
can be interpreted as elasticities. The indirect effect of price markups 
on productivity is – 2 × 0.25 = – 0.5. The reported elasticities for the 
effect of price markups in t-1 are approximations as they capture the 
indirect effect of price markups in t-2(!) on productivity in t.
TABLE 16: Combined, Direct, and Indirect Effect on Competition in TFP
Total
(a)
Manufacturing
(b)
Trade
(c)
Services
(d)
System 1: Innovation variable is ln (InnoExpit)
Combined effect – 0.680*** (0.093) – 1.940*** (0.175) – 3.552*** (0.440) 0.057 (0.103)
Direct effect – 0.789*** (0.072) – 2.088*** (0.104) – 3.080*** (0.486) 0.271** (0.121)
Indirect effect (Approximation) – 0.079 – 0.140 – 0.217 – 0.174
System 2: Innovation variable is ln (R & DExpit)
Combined effect – 0.680*** (0.093) – 1.940*** (0.104) – 3.552*** (0.440) 0.057 (0.103)
Direct effect – 0.821*** (0.077) – 1.940*** (0.106) – 3.595*** (0.418) 0.411** (0.194)
Indirect effect (Approximation) – 0.095 – 0.205 0.059 – 0.375
The table reports the combined effect of lagged markups on total factor productivity (from Table 11), the direct effect (from Table 15, Equation 2), and the approximated indirect 
effect. The latter is calculated as the effect  of price markups on innovation (from Table 15, Equation 1) times the effect of innovation on productivity (from Table 15, Equation 2). 
Direct and indirect effects do not need to sum up to the combined effect. The reported indirect effects in columns (a), (b), and (d) are based on statistically significant estimated 
elasticities (the underlying estimated elasticities in column (c) are not statistically significant). They do not otherwise carry any claims of inference.
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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(to obtain the combined effect), this contribution is rela­
tively small.
Third, in the services sector, we see countervailing effects, 
with a relatively large negative indirect effect offsetting the 
positive direct effect. The direct effect (e. g., via managerial 
practices)	implies	a	0.27 percent	increase	of	productiv­
ity	in	System	1	and	a	0.41 percent	increase	in	System	2	in	
response	to	a	1 percent	increase	in	price	markups.	At	the	
same time, our approximations of the indirect effect (by 
way of a firm’s innovation activities that are a function 
of	price	markups)	suggest	a	-0.17 percent	(System	1)	and	
-0.38 percent	(System	2)	decrease	in	response	to	a	1 per­
cent increase in price markups. 
Last, we do not find evidence for an indirect effect in the 
trade sector. R & D and innovation play a subordinated role 
in trade, and changes in the competitive environment have 
little impact on how much firms innovate.
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effect and conclude that a firm’s innovation activity does 
not contribute to the effect of competition (or the lack 
thereof) on productivity in that sector.
Our findings of relatively strong direct effects of price 
markups (in comparison to the innovation­centered indi­
rect effects) in all sectors but services highlight the poten­
tial for a well­tailored competition policy approach in 
society’s effort to tackle the productivity slowdown. This 
is particularly true for the trade sector, where the effect of 
competition on R & D and innovation is of limited signifi­
cance for the determination of firm­level productivity. For 
services, on the other hand, the interdependence of com­
petition and innovation in their effect on productivity must 
be taken into account as the indirect effect partially offsets 
the direct effect of competition on productivity. Considering 
one without the other will be misguiding.
This study zooms in on the effect of price markups on 
productivity and must put aside other areas – no less 
important – in which markups affect economic outcomes. 
Markups have implications for labor markets, as they are 
often linked to the decrease of labor shares, stagnating real 
wages, and wage inequality. Markups are also said to have 
implications for financial markets, since increased market 
power is associated with a decrease in the capital share. 
These and other implications directly affect firms’ output 
and, as a consequence, domestic product (De Loecker et al., 
2020). For these reasons, the evaluation of market power is 
highly relevant from a political perspective; not only with 
regard to competition policy, but also with regard to labor 
and capital market regulation or innovation policy.
7 Conclusion
In this report, we have presented results from our firm­
level estimation of price­cost margins in the form of price 
markups (i. e., price above marginal cost) on a sample of 
more than 12,000 German firms over the period of 2007 
through 2016. We find that price markups across indus­
tries	are	at	30-45 percent,	with	the	highest	markups	in	
the services sector and the lowest in trade. The estimates 
are significantly lower than those reported for the U.S. (De 
Loecker et al., 2020), but in line with estimates for Europe 
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018; Cavalleri et al., 2019). 
Price markups are an important determinant of produc­
tivity,	explaining	as	much	as	40 percent	of	the	variation	
of firm­level total factor productivity. We further show 
that markups have a negative effect on productivity in 
manufacturing	and	trade.	A	1 percent	increase	in	price	
markups	results	in	a	2 percent	and	3.5 percent	decrease	in	
productivity for firms in the manufacturing and trade sec­
tor, respectively. When interpreting higher levels of price 
markups as lower levels competition, these results are in 
line with the “quiet­life hypothesis” (Hicks, 1935) or the 
notion of “X­inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966) and com­
port with recent empirical findings (Schmitz, 2005; Matsa, 
2011; Bloom et al., 2019; Backus, 2019). Our findings further 
suggest that pro­competitive policies (with the effect of 
curbing firm’s market power and lowering firm­level price 
markups) have the potential to increase firm­level produc­
tivity – in manufacturing and trade. In the services sector, 
however, our results are reversed, calling for a differenti­
ated policy approach.
When separately estimating the direct effect of price 
markups on productivity (keeping innovation constant) and 
the indirect effect (where price markups affect innovation 
and innovation in turn is a determinant of productivity), we 
find that, in manufacturing, the negative indirect effect is 
relatively small but reinforces the negative direct effect. In 
services, on the other hand, the negative indirect effect is 
sizable and partially offsets the positive direct effect. Last, 
for the trade sector, we do not find a significant indirect 
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9 Appendix 
ities (N) a common (“services”) PPI is used (available 
only for 2006 onwards). 
• Last, labor costs are deflated by using a Eurostat labor 
costs deflator that is based on the respective Nace  
section level. 
9.2 Industry Breakdown
In Table 17, we provide the number of firms and number 
of observations for each of the individual 12 Nace sections. 
Table 2 in the main text provides information for sections 
manufacturing (C), trade (G), and services (H, I, J, L, M, 
and N). 
9.3 Productivity Impact of Markups: 
Heterogeneity over Time
We further ask if the productivity­markup relationship 
changes over time and, if so, do the estimated elasticities 
follow a particular time trend? In Table 18, we present 
results from regressions where we interact the explana­
tory variable of interest (firm­level price markups) with 
year dummies (using 2007 as our base year). We report 
the baseline elasticity (for 2007) and the year­interaction 
terms for the total economy and separately for each sector.
The estimated productivity­markup elasticities are fairly 
constant over time. For trade and services, we do not see 
any significant changes over time in how markups affect 
productivity. An exceptions is manufacturing where we 
observe a weaker (yet still negative) relationship between 
markup and productivity around the beginnings of the 
European sovereign debt crisis (2008) and in the more 
recent years in our estimation sample (2015­2016).  
However, these effects also vanish in the intertemporal 
estimation when we study the link between lagged markup 
and productivity in Table 19. 
9.1 Further Details on Sample Construction
Our sample does not contain data on physical inputs 
(except for the number of employees) nor on physical out­
put. Instead, we observe the necessary variables in terms 
of their value in euros (as of a given year). To make obser­
vations comparable across time, we apply a deflator.43 For 
revenue, material costs, and capital stock we use the producer 
price indices (PPI) provided by Eurostat.44 For labor costs, 
we use a labor costs deflator provided by Eurostat.
• For Nace section Manufacturing (C), we use the two­
digit Nace divisions PPIs when available for all years; 
otherwise, we use the PPI associated with the main Nace 
section.45
• For Nace section Wholesale and retail trade (G), we con­
struct a PPI using data on revenue and deflated revenue 
on a two­digit Nace code level from Eurostat. We con­
struct the PPI using the formula 
     (15)  
       revenuet––––––––––––––– * 100.
deflated revenuet
• For the remaining Nace sections Transportation and 
storage (H), Accommodation and food service activities 
(I), Information and communication (J), Real estate 
activities (L), Professional, scientific and technical activ­
ities (M), and Administrative and support service activ­
43 From Orbis, we obtain data on the closing date (i. e., the date the  
account was closed and the variables were collected). The relevant  
period for a firm is therefore from closing date in t to the one in t+1. 
While the closing date of many firms is December 31st, some close at 
January 1st or other dates throughout the year. This misalignment of 
calendar year and fiscal year poses an issue. Because we only have  
annual deflators, we have to arbitrarily choose how we deflate our 
data. This means, for a misaligned fiscal year, we have to assign it to 
a calendar year to be able to use our deflators. We choose to use July 
1st as a cutoff date. For example, all variables collected from July 1st, 
2005 to June 30th, 2006 are deflated with the 2005 PPI.
44 The relevant time series can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/eu­
rostat/en/data/database.
45 This is the case for Nace division C33.
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TABLE 17: Number of Firms and Observations by Industry (Nace Section)
Nace Section Firms Obs.
C Manufacturing 5,435 33,942
G Trade (Wholesale and retail trade) 3,671 22,521
H Logistics (Transportation and storage) 659 4,126
I Accomondation & food (Accommodation and food service activities) 187 1,013
J IT (Information and communication) 624 3,592
L Real estate (Real estate activities) 120 563
M Professional (Professional, scientific, and technical activities) 814 4,681
N Administrative (Administrative and support service activities) 453 2,478
Total 11,963 72.916
The table contains, for each of the 8 selected Nace sections in our estimation sample, the total number of firms and the total  
number of observations. Throughout this report, we use the abbreviated section names as introduced in this table. 
Source: Numbers based on data obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and authors’ own calculations.
TABLE 18: Productivity-Markup Elasticities Over Time
Dependent variable:
ln (Productivityit)
Total
(1)
Manufacturing 
(2)
Trade
(3)
Services
(4)
ln (Markupit) – 1.3840*** (0.0847) – 2.3630*** (0.142) – 4.1690*** (0.235) – 0.0338 (0.0627)
x 2008 – 0.0867 (0.0769) – 0.0446 (0.135) 0.0776 (0.234) – 0.0168 (0.0533)
x 2009 – 0.0146 (0.0827) 0.2580* (0.139) 0.2190 (0.238) – 0.0201 (0.0580)
x 2010 – 0.0189 (0.0871) 0.0743 (0.148) – 0.0207 (0.255) – 0.0172 (0.0594)
x 2011 – 0.0621 (0.0872) 0.0328 (0.148) – 0.1970 (0.269) 0.0059 (0.0598)
x 2012 – 0.1350 (0.0871) 0.0652 (0.148) – 0.0087 (0.261) – 0.0539 (0.0612)
x 2013 – 0.0893 (0.0875) 0.0923 (0.147) – 0.0386 (0.265) – 0.0439 (0.0619)
x 2014 – 0.0345 (0.0896) 0.1650 (0.150) – 0.0294 (0.268) – 0.0065 (0.0634)
x 2015 0.0215 (0.0894) 0.2650* (0.153) – 0.1760 (0.270) 0.0141 (0.0638)
x 2016 0.0488 (0.0948) 0.3670** (0.168) – 0.1170 (0.296) 0.0264 (0.0679)
The table reports results from pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity (obtained from the production-function estimation in 
log scale). Independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of firm-level price markups and year-interaction terms (base year: 2007). Reported coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities. For more estimation details, see the notes for Table 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Souce: Authors’ own calculations.
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TABLE 20.: Direct and Indirect Effect of Competition on Labor Productivity (System)
Total
(a)
Manufacturing
(b)
Trade
(c)
Services
(d)
System 1 – Equation 1: Dep. Var.: ln(InnoExpi,t-1) (Observations: 2,026)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 1.480*** (0.496) – 2.771*** (0.787) – 1.305 (2.271) – 1.500** (0.693)
R2 0.344 0.341 0.103 0.377
System 1 – Equation 2: Dep. Var.: ln (Labor Productivityit) (Observations: 2,026)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.544*** (0.071) – 2.038*** (0.110) – 3.401 (0.397) 0.533 *** (0.097)
ln(InnoExpi,t-1) 0.047*** (0.007) 0.064*** (0.006) 0.082 (0.084) 0.065*** (0.015)
R2 0.316 0.250 0.168 0.349
System 2 – Equation 1: Dep. Var.: ln(R & DExpi,t-1) (Observations: 1,932)
ln(Markupi,t-2) – 1.551*** (0.481) – 4.074*** (0.787) 0.957 (1.999) – 1.617*** (0.565)
R2 0.402 0.381 0.070 0.483
System 2 – Equation 2: Dep. Var.: ln (Labor Productivityit) (Observations: 1,932)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 0.568*** (0.075) – 1.871*** (0.112) – 3.740 (0.316) 0.614*** (0.131)
ln(R & DExpi,t-1) 0.054*** (0.008) 0.063*** (0.006) – 0.040 (0.151) 0.123*** (0.036)
R2 0.302 0.252 0.514 0.151
Year FE
2-digit Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
The number of observations refers to the sample for the total economy. The table reports results from a two-equation system estimation for the matched sample of ZEW’s MIP and 
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. In System 1, the dependent variable in Equation 1 is the natural logarithm of innovation expenditure in year t – 1; in System 2, the dependent variable 
in Equation 1 is the natural logarithm of R & D expenditure in year t – 1. In both systems, the dependent variable in Equation 2 is the natural logarithm of labor productivity in year t.  
The indirect effect of competition is captured by the natural logarithm of  firm-level price markups in year t – 2 in Equation 1. The direct effect of competition is measured via the natural 
logarithm of firm-level price markups in year t – 1 in Equation 2. Both equations control for year FE and 2-digit industry effects, and Equation 1 additionally includes firm size  
(as ln(Assets)) as control. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.   
TABLE 19: Productivity-Markup Elasticities (Lagged) Over Time
Dependent variable:
ln(Productivityit)
Total
(1)
Manufacturing 
(2)
Trade
(3)
Services
(4)
ln(Markupi,t-1) – 1.4660*** (0.0961) – 2.2540*** (0.169) – 4.4270*** (0.286) – 0.1340* (0.0725)
x 2009 – 0.0337 (0.0852) 0.0246 (0.159) 0.4380* (0.262) 0.0670 (0.0602)
x 2010 0.0269 (0.0937) 0.2280 (0.163) 0.4880* (0.292) 0.0563 (0.0654)
x 2011 – 0.0076 (0.0949) – 0.0647 (0.170) 0.1700 (0.303) 0.0885 (0.0654)
x 2012 – 0.0450 (0.0953) – 0.0363 (0.172) 0.0811 (0.307) 0.0551 (0.0664)
x 2013 – 0.0503 (0.0966) 0.0087 (0.170) 0.2120 (0.307) 0.0064 (0.0686)
x 2014 – 0.0492 (0.0975) 0.0453 (0.173) 0.1510 (0.312) 0.0399 (0.0702)
x 2015 0.0353 (0.0995) 0.1460 (0.176) 0.1400 (0.315) 0.0786 (0.0711)
x 2016 0.1220 (0.105) 0.2080 (0.189) 0.0995 (0.346) 0.1070 (0.0752)
The table reports results from pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity (obtained from the production-function estimation 
in log scale). Independent variable of interest is the lagged natural logarithm of firm-level price markups and year interaction terms (base year: 2008). Reported coefficients are 
interpreted as elasticities. For more estimation details, see the notes for Table 8. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Assumption 1. A firm’s information set at period t, that is 
lit, includes current and past productivity shocks {ωiτ} tτ  = 0 
but does not include future productivity shocks {ωiτ} ∞τ =  t + 1. 
The transitory shocks satisfy E[ ∍it  | lit] =  0.
Assumption 2. Productivity shocks evolve according to the  
distribution
p (ωit  + 1|Iit) = p (ωit  + 1|ωit)
Assumption 3 states that the level of capital available for 
the production process in period t is decided in period t–1. 
Labor input available for production in t is chosen after 
capital but before t. This latter part of the assumption can 
be motivated by costs of labor turnover (e. g., menu costs 
such as hiring and firing of employees).
Assumption 3. Firms accumulate capital according to 
kit    =  k  (ki,t–1, ii,t–1)
where investment iit–1 is chosen in period t–1. Labor input lit 
is chosen at period t–b (with 0 < b < 1).
Per Assumption 4, materials are an input variable that can 
be freely adjusted after the realization of the productivity 
shock in t. 
Assumption 4. Firms’ variable input demand is given by
mit =  ft
~  (kit, lit, ωit, zit)
To summarize the timing of decisions and shocks relevant for 
production in t: the firm chooses the capital level in t–1 upon 
which the firm decides how much labor to employ (in t–b).
We will further assume strict monotonicity of the materials 
input function  f~(•). We make this assumption to guarantee 
the existence of the inverse of  f~(•) as our input demand 
ωit  =  f
~
t
–1(kit, lit,mit). This allows us to use materials mit as a 
proxy for ωit. This assumption holds as long as more pro­
ductive firms do not set disproportionately higher markups 
than less productive firms (Levinsohn and Melitz, 2006).
Assumption 5. 
mit  = f
~
t  (kit, lit, ωit, zit) is strictly increasing in ωit.
Last, Assumption 6 guarantees the comparability of the 
estimated values across firms, given our data are in mone­
tary values rather than physical units.
9.4 Direct and Indirect Effect of Competition 
on Labor Productivity
We report in Table 20 the results for the system of  
equations (equations (14) and (15)), using innovation 
expenditure (System 1) and R & D expenditure (System 2) 
as	dependent	variables	in	equation	(14)	[Equation	1]	and	
labor productivity as dependent variable in equation (15) 
[Equation	2].	The	results	reported	in	the	main	text	(with	
total factor productivity as the dependent variable in equa­
tion (15)	and	summarized	in	Table	15	follow	through.	
9.5 Estimating Price Markups
9.5.1 Obtaining the Output Elasticity
General Setup
To obtain an estimate of the output elasticity, we need  
to estimate the firm’s production function. We follow  
the control­function approach in Ackerberg et al. (2015). 
We restrict our attention to production functions with a 
scalar Hicks­neutral productivity term and common tech­
nology parameters across the set of producers in the same 
industry. These restrictions imply the following production 
function:
(16)  Qit = F (Xit
1, …, Xit
V, Kit) exp  ωit
Let Yit denote the level of observable output of firm i in t. 
Further, assume that observable output is stochastic with 
Yit  =  Qit  exp ∍it where ∍it are i. i. d. shocks which include 
measurement errors and unanticipated shocks to produc­
tion. Given Yit we obtain
(17)  Yit = F (Xit
1, …, Xit
V, Kit) exp (ωit  +  ∍it) 
Taking logs of this general form production function, we 
obtain:
(18)  yit = f (xit
1, …, xit
V, kit) + ωit + ∍it
This log­production function will form the basis of our 
estimation.
Assumptions
In order to identify the parameters in a production function 
(18), we make a number of assumptions (Ackerberg et al., 
2015). Given Assumptions 1 and 2, firms do not know future 
productivity shocks but only their distribution.
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Assumption 6. Firms are price takers in both input and out­
put markets and they face the same prices for equivalent 
inputs or outputs.
Production Function Estimation
We use the two­step control function estimation by Ack­
erberg et al. (2015). Following De Loecker and Scott (2016), 
we rely our estimation on a structural value added produc­
tion function: 
(19)  Yit = min [γm  Mit, F(Lit, Kit) exp (ωit)] exp ( ∍it)
Hence, in the optimum the cost minimizing firm sets the 
marginal product of material inputs equal to the marginal 
product of labor and capital. For this reason, both of the 
following equations hold: 
(20)  Yit = γm  Mit   exp ( ∍it)
(21)  Yit = F(Lit, Kit) exp (ωit  +  ∍it)
The complementarity between material inputs with labor 
and capital allows for different estimation procedures of 
the first stage, which either relies on equation 20 or equa­
tion 21.	Both	specifications	theoretically	yield	the	same	
production function estimates. In the following, we use 
equation 6 for the first stage of the procedure.
Stage 1: In the first stage, we separate unobserved pro duc­
tivity ωit from the error term ∍it. Therefore, we use  
the inverse of the variable input demand function  
ωit  =  f
~
t 
–1 (kit, lit, zit) and estimate non­parametrically:
(22)  
Yit = ß0  + ßk kit   +  ßl lit  + f
~
t
–1  (kit, lit, zit) +  ∍it
     = φ(kit, lit, zit) +  ∍it
Note that the parameter zit captures fixed effects and 
non­linear transformations of the production inputs labor 
and capital. The moment condition in the first stage –  
following Ackerberg et al. (2015) – is 
(23)  E [ ∍it | Iit] = E [yit – φ it (kit, lit, zit) | Iit] = 0
From this first stage, we obtain the expected output φˆit  
and an estimate for ∍it.
Stage 2: In the second stage, we estimate the production 
function coefficients. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that we 
can express ωit as a function of its realization in the  
previous period and an innovation term ξit:
(24)  ωit   =  g (ωit–1) +  ξit
By construction, E [ξit | Iit–1] = 0. The term ξit can be thought 
of as capturing innovation to productivity. Moreover, given 
our first­stage estimation, we can express ωit as 
(25)  ωit   =  φˆ it  (kit, lit, zit) – ß0  +  ßk kit  +  ßl lit
Combining equations (24) and (25) we get the following 
equation:
(26)  ωit   =  g (φˆit–1  (kit–1, lit–1, zit–1) – ß0  + ßk kit–1  + ßl lit–1) + ξit
We estimate equation (26) using standard GMM techniques 
to obtain the estimates of the production function parame­
ters. Given our assumptions the moment conditions are:
(27)   
                 1
E ξit  (ß)  kit   =  0. 
              lit–1
 
Implementation
To estimate price markups, the cost share of a variable 
input (over revenue) and an estimate of the output elastic­
ity are required. We choose labor (the number of employ­
ees) to be the variable input which will be the basis for the 
markup estimation. To obtain output elasticities, we esti­
mate a sector­specific production function for each of the 
12 Nace Rev. 2 industry codes. In order to estimate produc­
tion functions, we need to make an assumptions about the 
functional forms of the production functions. 
When using the structural value added production technol­
ogy the markup equation needs to be adjusted since mate­
rials are not in the estimated production function but still 
influence marginal costs. Given the particular form of the 
production function, marginal costs are given by 
(28)                          PMitλQit    =  λFit + –––––,                      ßm
where λFit are the marginal costs of the first part in opera­
tor and last term are the marginal costs of materials. In the 
markup estimation, this translate to
(29)   
               1
μit  =  –––––––––,        μ–1Fit  +  αMit
where μFit is the markup estimator obtained with labor and 
αMit the cost share of materials (over revenue).
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to rely on current labor to identify the coefficients on labor. 
The implication of this is that the wedge between a firm’s 
output elasticity of labor and the share of the labor costs in 
sales will capture an additional component reflecting these 
adjustment costs. In this case, given that material inputs 
are potentially less prone to adjustment costs, one can 
estimate a gross output production function and compute 
markups using the output elasticity of materials and its 
expenditure share (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012).
Unobserved Prices Using financial statement data, we do 
not observe physical quantities sold but use deflated sales 
revenue as a measure of output Y. As a consequence, the 
approach is potentially subject to an omitted price varia­
ble bias. This implies that the estimated markups may be 
underestimated because the expected correlation between 
inputs and prices is negative. Notice, however, that unob­
served prices will likely impact only the level of price 
markups but not their evolution across time.
Perfectly Competitive Input Markets This assumption implies 
that firms take the prices on the input markets as given and 
no bargaining occurs. This assumption is not an innocuous 
one, and might not be satisfied in reality. 
Price Setting Behavior Prices are set period by period, mean­
ing that there are no price dynamics within a given period. 
To our knowledge, this issue has yet to be solved in the 
literature.
We use a Cobb­Douglas functional form for our structural 
value added production function. This assumption implies 
a constant elasticity of substitution. The output elasticity of 
the variable input labor is then:
(30)   θL,it   =  ßl
For the first stage estimation of the production function, 
we apply a polynomial of 4th degree for Φit  (kit, lit, mit). We 
further include industry (2­digit Nace industry codes) fixed 
effects and federal­state fixed effects. For the second stage 
of the estimation of the production function, we apply a 3rd 
degree polynomial for g(ωit–1).  
9.5.2 Obtaining Expenditure Shares for Labor 
Recall that observed output is:
(31) Yit   =  Qit   exp    ∍it
With ∍it representing i. i. d shocks. We therefore do not 
directly observe the correct cost share of a variable input 
from the data. To remedy this problem, we utilize the esti­
mate for ∍it obtained in stage 1 of our estimation procedure. 
We can compute the corrected expenditure share as follows:
(32)   
            PXit XitαˆXit   = ––––––––––                Yit           Pit –––––                exp ∍ˆit
This correction eliminates any variation in cost shares that 
is not correlated with labor, capital, materials, and other 
firm characteristics that are included in the estimation of 
the production function. 
9.5.3 Some Limitations
The approach by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to 
recover firm­level price markups from financial statement 
data has been widely used in the literature in recent years. 
The approach does – nevertheless – comes with a num­
ber of limitations. In the sequel, we briefly summarize the 
respective discussion in the literature (where it applies).
Adjustment Costs of Input Variables The estimation routine  
is executed under the assumption that labor is a static  
production input, which is in line with the notion that we 
can learn about markups from the optimal hiring decisions. 
However, if labor is a dynamic input due to adjustment 
costs such as hiring and firing, then in order to obtain  
consistent estimates of the production function one needs 
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